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 4 
Introduction  
 
The 2008 global financial crisis has significantly impacted on European societies and 
economies, including the Greek. Greece, which has been affected by the profound global 
transformations of the crisis, compared to other Eurozone countries with similar external 
financial pressures and difficulties, such as Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, is the 
most problematic case and has been characterized as a unique international paradox1. This 
uniqueness had brought many failings, problems and weaknesses to Greece, ranging from poor 
labor, product market institutions, massive public debt, low competitiveness, to an 
underperforming educational system, poor environmental protection and high levels of 
corruption. Numerous experts’ reports, pieces of academic analysis, and public opinion have 
identified over the years the malfunctioning of the administrative system in the country. The 
overall extent of public intervention in the economy as well as society, which has been 
excessive by any standards and means of comparison, and the long tradition of legalism, 
formalism, and rigidity of administrative behavior at any level and state’s action aspect are the 
main factors responsible for this quality deficit. Additionally, the infiltration of the political, or 
better the party- political concerns into the operation of state agencies as well organizations at 
the center and the periphery of the country’s administrative machinery does only aggravate the 
condition of limited professionalism as well as low performance in public administration. 
Excessive size, political dependence, lack of professionalism and legalistic culture constitute 
the factors that explain much of the predicament of Greece’s public administration.2  
 
All the aforementioned weaknesses of the Greek state led the country very close to 
technical default and to bankruptcy, whilst the global credit crisis seemed to cease.3 The facts 
                                                          
1 Vasipoloulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Exadaktylos, T. (2013), “Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of 
Blame”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Introduction; Mitsopoulos, M., Pelagidis, T. (2012), “Understanding the Crisis in 
Greece From Boom to Bust”, Part 1, Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp.3-4. 
The uniqueness of Greece is attributable to the two following conflicting factors: The strong economic performance (rapid GDP 
growth and strong productivity), and the very poor performance and pathologies on many other fronts 
2  Makrydemetres Anth (2013), “Weaving Penelope’s Web. Administration and Democracy in Contemporary Greece, 
Administration and Society – No 9”, Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications, p. 118. 
3  Mitsopoulos, M., Pelagidis, T. (2012), “Understanding the Crisis in Greece From Boom to Bust”, Part 1, Introduction, 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp.3-4. 
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reveal that the urgent problems, weaknesses, and failings that dominated all these years in the 
Greek state and economy will be addressed only by a determined reform effort. 
 
This thesis examines the Greek case, given its uniqueness, and thus, the impact of the 
external conditionality (e.g. Crisis, Troika, Politics, Political Control and Party Dominance, 
etc.), 4  and the internal conditionality (e.g. Bureaucracy, Functioning and Structures of 
Administration, Personnel Professionalism, etc.) on its state’s administration reform. Moreover, 
it contrasts both, the pre-crisis and crisis periods, also using quantitative and qualitative data, as 
well as Greece with other EU countries, and especially with Portugal. It examines the sensitive 
area of contention, namely the administrative reform, to outline reform trends and content, from 
2007 to 2018. 
 
 Analytically, the first part examines and evaluates the time and the type of change in 
Greece, and generally what existed before the crisis, for a better understanding of the reason of 
the promotion of changes in some cases, and the persistence of the inertia in others. It proceeds 
with an enumeration of the before crisis implied administrative reforms, so as to create a 
continuity and a sequence with the administrative reforms implied during the crisis. It considers 
the level and the extent of reform activity during the normal pre-crisis conditions of domestic 
politics and afterward with the external constraint. This enables us to highlight trends in reform 
and to detect the level of exploitation of the crisis opportunity. Finally, if no such an assessment 
of the pre-crisis period is carried out, it is difficult, and thus, precarious to proceed to an 
examination of the crisis period. That is because this assessment examines Greece’s recent 
administration history, the principles that govern it, the pathologies, the state-administration 
structure, and characteristics, explaining, thus, why Greece is a country closed to reforms.  
 
As far as the second part is concerned, it analyzes and comments on the role of the crisis, 
the Troika, and the political parties (exogenous forces) in the procedure of the implementation 
of the administrative reform, as well as the power of bureaucracy and other endogenous 
                                                          
4  Lyrintzis Chr. (2001), “Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: Reassessing Causes and Effects”, The European 
Institute, Hellenic Odservatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe – No 45, LondonL The London Scholl of Economics 
and Political Science; Mavrogordatos G.T. (2001), :Pressure Groups and Democracy:, Athens: Papazisis Publishers; 
Sotiropoulos D.A. (2007), “State and Reform in Contemporary Southern Europe: Greece-Spain-Portugal”, Athens: Potamos 
Publications.  
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circumstances that affected administrative reform action. It deepens in the categorization of the 
administrative reforms, also using quantitative and qualitative data for indicating the level of 
administrative reform of Greece; it considers the content and paradigmatic frames of the pursed 
administrative reforms. A better understanding of the effects of external and internal 
conditionality is one the result of the analysis. 
 
The third part compares and analyzes the impact of the adjustment programmes on the 
public administration in Greece and Portugal. Portugal was selected given that shares certain 
similar historical, political, economical, as well as social characteristics with Greece; Greece 
and Portugal share common tradition regarding their administration, originating from the 
Napoleonic administrative pattern. It assesses and compares the reform capacity of these two 
countries in the pre and after crisis period. Finally, it explains the reasons for the promotion 
or/and non-promotion of the reforms in each case.  
 
The conclusion sums up all the three previous deductions, underlines Greece’s 
uniqueness mainly due to its state-administrative structure and characteristics, and proposes the 
optimal strategy for Greece.   
 
The thesis is completed with the bibliography and the appendix, in which I draw up 
diagrams in order to evaluate the period I report.  
 
 
Before proceeding to the first part, for the purpose of this thesis, public administration 
reform includes according to the United Nations changes in the organizational structure of 
public administration, the human resources management, and also the public finances, as well 
as decentralization, regulatory reforms, and results-based management.5 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 UNDP (2004), ‘Public Administration Reform: Practice Note’, available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity- building/public-administration-reform-practice-note.html) , 
accessed 16/7/2018. 
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PART I: Historical Context of Greece: From 1974 to 2007 
 
Introduction 
It is very critical to examine and evaluate the timing of inertia6, as well as the timing of 
the change 7 in Greece, and specifically how the Greek problems and their solutions were 
perceived before the crisis, using the key doctrines of Historical Institutionalism (HI). 
Historical Institutionalism offers a framework useful for a deeper understanding of the reasons 
for the promotion of the change in some issues and the reasons why inertia persists in other 
types of policy problems.8 The notions of time, timing, and tempo, as well as the concepts of 
‘path dependence’, ‘critical junctures’ and ‘increasing returns’, are important in Historical 
Institutionalism and enable us to understand the temporal dimension of change9. According to 
Levi,10 ‘path dependence’ occurs when the cost of a country to change paths becomes very high 
because that country has already followed one. Pierson also explains ‘path dependence’ and 
concludes that the cost of remaining in the same path is usually significantly lower than the cost 
of changing paths.11 
 
As far as the Greek Case is concerned, Greece's recent administrative history indicates 
that the country has fallen into the concept of ‘path dependence’ and increasing returns12have 
not been facilitating change13. However, there is an argument about whether or not the current 
                                                          
6 Hay, C. and Wincott, D. (1998), “Structure, agency and historical institutionalism”, Political Studies XLVI: 51-57. 
7 Hay, C. and Wincott, D. (1998), “Structure, agency and historical institutionalism”, Political Studies XLVI: 51-57. 
8 Ladi, S. (2012), “The Eurozone crisis and austerity politics: a trigger for administrative reform in Greece?”, Theorizing the 
Timing and The Type of Change, GreeSE Papers 57, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 3.  
9 Op. cit. 
10 Levi M. (1997), “A model, a method, and a map: rational choice in comparative and historical analysis”. In M. Lichbach and 
A. Zuckerman (eds.) Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
11 Person, P. (2004), “Politics in Time”, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Preen. 
12 According to Tushar Seth, “Increasing returns mean lower costs per unit just as diminishing returns mean higher costs. Thus, 
the law f of increasing return signifies that cost per unit of the marginal or additional output falls with the expansion of an 
industry. As more and more units of the commodity are produced, the cost per unit goes on steadily falling.”, article “Law of 
Increasing Returns”, available at Economics Discussion, available at: http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/law-of-returns/law-
of-increasing-returns-explained-with-diagram/1593, accessed 1/5/2018.  
13  Ladi, S. (2012), “The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics: A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece?”, 2. 
Theorizing the Timing and The Type of Change, GreeSe Paper No. 57, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast 
Europe, p. 3. 
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economic crisis has changed the increasing returns in relation to administrative change, as well 
as an argument on the country's search on a new equilibrium14. The current economic crisis is a 
typical example of a ‘critical juncture’. Critical junctures refer to those moments and events, 
small or bigger -including the 2008 current economic crisis- that have a lasting impact on 
countries as well as a right timing.15 Bulmer and Burch16 conclude that a critical juncture leads 
to change when three parameters are expected to play an important role: 
 
 Exogenous forces; (crisis, Troika, etc.) 
 Endogenous circumstances (bureaucracy, functioning and structures of administration, 
personnel professionalism, etc.), or 
 The result of a particular group or individual coming to power (politics, political control 
and party dominance )17 
 
At this point, it is essential to add some clarity to the concept of change. Hall 18 
distinguishes between simple change and radical transformation. According to his assertions, 
there are three distinct types of policy change: 
 
1. First Order Change (instrument setting change while overall goals and policy 
instruments remain the same) 
2. Second Order Change (both policy instruments and settings change but policy goals 
remain the same) 
3. Third Order Change (or policy paradigm change –occurs rarely and is radical -“the 
framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind 
                                                          
14 Op. cit.  
15 Pierson, P. (2000), “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics”, The American Political Science Review. 
16  Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (1998) “Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British state and European Union”, Public 
Administration. 
17 Lyrintzis Chr. (2001), “Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: Reassessing Causes and Effects”, The European 
Institute, Hellenic Odservatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe – No 45, LondonL The London Scholl of Economics 
and Political Science; Mavrogordatos G.T. (2001), :Pressure Groups and Democracy:, Athens: Papazisis Publishers; 
Sotiropoulos D.A. (2007), “State and Reform in Contemporary Southern Europe: Greece-Spain-Portugal”, Athens: Potamos 
Publications. 
18  Hall, P. (1993), “Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain”, 
Comparative Politics. 
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of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems 
they are meant to be addressing”) 
 
Hall claims that the first two order changes are incremental whilst the third one, paradigm 
shift, is not in nature and does not necessarily follow first and second order change. 
Additionally, a policy paradigm shift does not necessarily occur when a critical conjuncture 
exists. Policy experimentation and policy failure are equally likely.  
 
As explained above, it is importantly significant to evaluate what existed in a country, 
namely in Greece, before the crisis in order to be able to both understand a change at a 
particular moment and to describe that change either as an administrative paradigm shift or an 
incremental change, and to proceed to an interpretation of Greece’s difficulty to reform. 
According to Howlett and Ramesh's distinction between ‘dominant’ and ‘hegemonic’ 
paradigm, 19  the governance paradigm of Greece is described as dominant. As far as the 
dominant governance is concerned, is characterized by the coexistence of liberal and more 
social directions in a country, supported by different networks, whereas the hegemonic one is 
described by the existence of only one unchallenged model supported by a closed policy 
community. Thus, Greece’s dominant governance is best descried as a quasi-Weberian 
hierarchical bureaucracy.20 On the other hand, Greece, as well as France, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, is characterized as a Napoleonic state on the grounds that it derives from France. 21 
Although, these five countries have common roots concerning public administration, however, 
the changes observed over the years in those countries have been not only many but substantial.  
 
A. Historical Context 
 
                                                          
19  Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (1998), “Policy subsystem configurations and policy change: Operationalizing the post-
positivist analysis of the politics of the policy process”, Policy Studies Journal. 
20 Ladi, S. (2012), “The eurozone crisis and austerity politics: a trigger for administrative reform in Greece?”, Dominant 
Administrative Paradigm in Greece, GreeSE Papers 57, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, 7, pp. 7-
16. 
21 Ongaro, E. (2009), “Public Management Reform and Modernization: Trajectories of Administrative Change in Italy, France, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain”, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
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a. Critical Junctures 
Greece's transition to Democracy-which as mentioned above can be described as a first 
critical juncture of the Greek public administration-and the consequent economic stringency of 
that period were responsible to the formation of the current government model in Greece, 
established in the 1970's.22 Until 1981, the supreme conservative party, which held power, was 
New Democracy (ND) under the leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis.23 On January 1st, 
1981, the Karamanlis government managed to fully integrate Greece in the European 
Community (EC) in which it became an active member. Nevertheless, it is very questionable 
whether or not this time of period was a second critical juncture.24 On October 18th, 1981, 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou won 
the elections and took office. Andreas Papandreou became initially the Prime Minister of the 
country, and since 1996, Costas Simitis replaced him, took office and became Prime Minister. 
In 2001, under the Simitis Government, Greece became the twelfth country to adopt the single 
Euro currency, ditching its former drachma. Greece's entry in the EMU constitutes the third 
critical juncture in its modern administrative history.25 
 
The first two of the three critical junctures were highlighted by important attempts, 
aiming to change the administrative model in Greece. Democratization, legitimization of the 
political and administrative system along with patronage practices, which were inherited from 
the post-authoritarian period, had to be dealt.26 Specifically, in the first period outlined above, 
from 1974 until 1981, from the period of transition to democracy onwards, the main problems, 
as well as priorities of the state, were the consolidation of democracy and its international 
position.27 Legislative and administrative measures reinforced the democratic institutions of the 
country and a great effort was put into Greece's entry in the European Community. 
                                                          
22 Ladi, S. (2012), “The eurozone crisis and austerity politics: a trigger for administrative reform in Greece?”, Dominant 
Administrative Paradigm in Greece, GreeSE Papers 57, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, pp. 7-16. 
23 Op. cit. 
24 Op. cit.  
25 Op. cit.  
26  Featherstone, K. (1990), “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Greece”, in G. Pridham (ed.), Securing 
Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. London: Routledge; Featherstone, K. (2005), 
“Modernisation and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics”, West European Politics. 
27 Ladi, S. (2012), “The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics: A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece?”, 3. Dominant 
Administrative Paradigm in Greece, GreeSe Paper No. 57, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, pp.7-
16.  
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Analytically, Karamanlis as a Prime Minister strengthened the executive body and underlined 
the importance of having a distinct public administration. He realized the nationalization of 
enterprises facing financial problems-as he did with Emporiki Bank- and the establishment of 
new organizations- Ministry of Town Planning and Environment28- aiming to the growth of the 
public sector. Following to Hall's classification, those administrative changes signified in this 
period can be categorized and described as third order changes. 
 
b. National Reforms in Greece 
Following the transition to democracy, the polarized conflict between New Democracy 
and PASOK, the two major parties that have alternated in power since 1974, formed Greek 
politics29. With the exception of 1989–1990, where short-lived coalition governments were 
formed, both parties had the capacity to forming strong one-party majorities in parliament.30 
 
i. Human resources development 
From 1981 onwards, the problems and priorities of the Greek state changed and now the 
effort was put into the growth of GDP, the reduction of unemployment rates, as well as the 
strengthening of the lower social classes. All the afore-mentioned led to the creation of new 
welfare institutions, and thus to the enlargement of the public sector. The training of public 
servants and decentralization are some of the effort used for those changes. Nonetheless, the 
Greek civil service has been characterized by low prestige and by a lack of an administrative 
elite.31 Analytically, the year of 1983 was underlined by the foundation of the National  Centre 
of Public Administration,32 the scope of which is the following missions: 
 
                                                          
28 Op. cit. 
29 Spanou, K. and Sotiropoulos, D. (2011), “The Odyssey of Administrative Reforms in Greece, 1981-2009: A tale of two 
reform paths”, Public Administration, pp.723-725. 
30 Ladi, S. (2012), “The Eurozone Crisis and Austerity Politics: A Trigger for Administrative Reform in Greece?”, Dominant 
Administrative Paradigm in Greece, GreeSe Paper No. 57, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe. pp. 7-
16. 
31 Sotiropoulos, D.A. (1999b), “A Description of the Higher Civil Service in Greece”, in E.C. Page and V. Wright (eds), 
Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States: A Comparative Analysis of Top Officials. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
32 Law 1388/1983 “Establishment of a National Center for Public Administration", establishment of a National School of Local 
Government and other provisions. OFFICIAL GAZETTE, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, A/207/1983. 
 12 
 The production of highly skilled top cadres for public administration, who would be 
trained by a National School of Public Administration (similar to the French ENA) 
before entering the public administration; and 
 The production in-service training for civil servants 
 
Although the first mission has served the lack of an administrative elite, that mission, 
initially, ran against resistance from the civil servants. On the other hand, the second mission 
was more successful as far as the training output is concerned, but not so as far as its impact on 
the operation of public services is concerned.  
 
In 1999, an important institutional reform was the introduction of collective bargaining 
rights for civil servants.33 Although there were limitations to this development, in terms of 
collective bargaining there was a convergence between the private and public sector, which was 
owed to the implementation of international labor law stipulations. Collective bargaining 
between the government and the civil service unions may reshape the absolute subjection of 
(individual) civil servants to political influence, to the extent that it promotes a more 
responsible and independent civil service organization. 
 
ii. Institution building reforms 
At that period of the time and during the 1990s it was possible to launch institutional 
reforms aiming at democratization of public administration. That democratization indicated the 
strengthening of local government, the improvement of citizen-administration relations, and the 
openness of expression of civil servants' political beliefs.34 Greece was driven by the urgency to 
increase the weak legitimacy of its political system, and thus, its state. Although the 
                                                          
33  Law 2738/1999 on collective bargaining in public administration, available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/printpdf/observatories/eurwork/articles/new-law-on-collective-bargaining-in-public-
administration , accessed 20/5/2018. 
34 Spanou, K. and Sotiropoulos, D. (2011), “The Odyssey of Administrative Reforms in Greece, 1981–2009: A tale of two 
reform paths”, Public Administration, pp. 723-725. 
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administrative reform has constantly been on the political agenda, yet the next government in 
power would discontinue or dismantle policies and measures taken by the previous one.35  
 
iii. Independent authorities and Citizen-Administration relations 
Not only PASOK but also ND government-that took office in 1989-had a dilemma on 
changes concerning the professionalization36 of public administration and on the use of the state 
for electoral purposes. However, only after 1993, under the A.G. Papandreou government, there 
were some signs of public modernization due to Greece's entry in the EMU as well as the 
introduction of Independent Authorities. These authorities are: 
 
 In 1994, the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP);37 
 In 1997, the Greek Ombudsman;38 
 In 1997, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority.39 
 
The first authority, ASEP, is the Higher Council for the Selection of Personnel with the 
responsibility of guaranteeing the selection procedure, based on merit, even in a difficult 
political environment. However, in 2004–2009, ASEP's scope for supervision was reduced due 
to the ND government’s practice of bypassing this authority. Meanwhile, the wide use of 
temporary contract employment reproduced a kind of spoils system and favored the client-party 
relations. Spanou on her scientific article “European integration in administrative terms: a 
                                                          
35 Spanou, C. (1996), “Penelope’s Suitors: Administrative Modernization and Party Competition in Greece”, West European 
Politics. 
36 According to Rikvan Berkel and Eva Knies at Bureaucracy, professionalism and managerialism in a street-level bureaucracy 
context: a frontline perspective -Paper prepared for panel 44,‘Street-level policy research: expanding the boundaries’, first ICPP 
conference, June 2013, Grenoble, France-, “Professionalism is based on the use of professional skills, expertise and knowledge, 
acquired through professional training and experience, in analysing and solving problems  (Duyvendak et al. 2006,Freidson 
2001). Professionalism requires autonomy at frontline level in order to enable professional judgment and supervision takes 
place by peers and colleagues rather than by officials higher up in the organizational hierarchy. In this case, standardizati on of 
skills is the dominant form of co-ordination (Mintzberg 1983).” 
37  Law 2190/1994 for the establishment of an independent authority for the selection of personnel and the regulation of 
management issues, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, A/28/1994, available at: 
http://www.gsrt.gr/Legislation/Files/LawFiles135/FEK%2028.pdf , accessed 20/5/2018. 
38  Law 2477/1997 “Ombudsman and Body of Inspectors-Controllers of Public Administration”, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, 
HELLENIC REPUBLIC, A/28/1997, available at: http://www.gsrt.gr/Legislation/Files/LawFiles135/FEK%2028.pdf , accessed 
21/5/2018. 
39Law 2472/1997 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, 
HELLENIC REPUBLIC, A/50/1997, available at: https://qa.auth.gr/documents/law/1997.2472.pdf , accessed 1/6/2018. 
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framework for analysis and the Greek case”,40 characterizes the Greek state as a state of a low 
degree of legitimacy. One term of the previous phrase could be the fact of the party's 
sovereignty over the administrative system. Thus, there is no guarantee of the continuity in 
governance. Nevertheless, there are lots of accusations against the public administration in 
Greece, the most common of which have been the lack of effectiveness41 and the widespread 
corruption42. As far as the last notion is concerned, corruption is highly detected at the lowest 
level of the administration. Patronage, 43  on the other hand, is one of the main causes of 
corruption and ineffectiveness, as well as one of the determinants of the Greek Public 
Administration failure, which is highly connected to the dominance of the party in power. The 
disastrous effects of patronage in the Greek Public Administration have been the violation of 
values of meritocracy in the selection and development of personnel just as so in public 
procurement, which led to the subversion of the technical and personnel capacity of public 
administration. All the above-mentioned explain the reduction of the ASEP's scope for 
supervision. 
 On the other hand, in 1999, a new Civil Service code was produced after a long 12-year 
incubation. 44 It should be noted here that since then the Civil Service code has often been 
amended. In 2004–09, when ND was in office, new legislation passed in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
addressed the same issues. The most significant change was made by Law 3528/2007,45 which 
made the criteria of selecting heads of administrative units more transparent, while introducing 
personal interviews, a technique often discredited in the Greek context. Civil service 
politicization has never been admitted by governments, which by law have leeway concerning 
promotions at the middle and the top ranks of the civil service and claim to select candidates for 
                                                          
40 Spanou, C. (1998), “European integration in administrative terms: a framework for analysis and the Greek case”, Journal of 
European Public Policy. 
41 According to Olga's Lukashenko analysis, “Towards Effective Public Administration”-Methodology for Functional Analysis- 
(2009), the “effectiveness in the organization’s performance” is “the focus of individual civil servants on the achievement of key 
government goals and objectives;” It is of vital importance the “strengthening of the responsibility and accountability 
framework in which civil servants operate.” 
42 The Cambridge Dictionary: “dishonest or illegal behavior involving a person in a position of power, for example, accepting 
money for doing something illegal or immoral”, available at: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/corruption  , 
accessed 25/04/2018. 
43  The Oxford Dictionary: “The power to control appointments to office or the right to privileges.” available at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/patronage , accessed 25/04/2018. 
44 Law 2683/1999 Ratification of the Code of State for Public Policies of Administrative Employees and Employees of NPAA 
and other provisions, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, A/19/1999, available at: https://www.e-
nomothesia.gr/kat-demosia-dioikese/n-2683-1999.html , accessed 3/6/2018. 
45  Law 3528/2007 ratifying the Code of Conduct for Public Administrative Employees, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=81308 , accessed 27/08/2018, International Labour 
Organization. 
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these ranks on a merit basis. 46  Despite such rhetoric, in practice, until 2010 when the 
formulation of new personnel policies aimed at making promotions transparent and 
standardized, all governments used to handpick their own supporters among prospective higher 
civil servants.47 
 
The last two authorities, the Greek Ombudsman and the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority, aim to protect citizens’ rights or the regulation of politically sensitive areas, as for 
instance the procedure of the recruitment to the civil service and radio-television48. In other 
words, these independent authorities took on the task of safeguarding the citizens' rights, 
endowed by series of legal provisions (1986, 1999, 2006), and seeking to hold the Greek public 
administration accountable. Citizens’ access to documents, protection of personal data 
justification of administrative acts, deadlines for response by public services, rights to appeal 
are some of the citizens' rights.49 
 
iv. Inspection and control bodies 
As far as its institutions and control mechanisms are concerned, Greek public 
administration has remained hierarchical and centralized. 50  This centralization of political 
power exhibits a double-sided rationale. On the one hand, control by the governing party and on 
the other, the central government’s control over centrifugal tendencies and fragmentation-for 
instance, through the monitoring of recruitment to the civil service and the functioning of 
control bodies.51 These two aspects often intermingle, when institutional arrangements cannot 
resist party-led political influence. Reformers intended to reverse the long-standing 
administrative deficiencies of inspection and control. Thus, new inspection and control bodies 
                                                          
46 Spanou, K. and Sotiropoulos, D. (2011), “The Odyssey of Administrative Reforms in Greece, 1981–2009: A tale of two 
reform paths”, Public Administration, p. 729. 
47 Op. cit.  
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were created since the early 1990s, being responsible for the assurance of the legality and the 
enhancement of the accountability of public administration.52 Specialized bodies were founded 
in sectors such as health, transport, and environment. Besides that, two more bodies were 
founded and helped to change the landscape of inspection and control. 53  These are the 
following: 
 
 A body of general competence, ‘Public Administration Inspectors’;54 
 A ‘General Inspector’s Service’, created in 2002,55 and assuming a coordinating role 
which was further entrusted with combating corruption. 
 
v. Public sector reform 
During the 1990s, there was a convergence between political parties on the need to 
restructure the public sector. However, the pressure of European integration priorities was the 
main factor leading to this restructuring.56 Thus, in the 1990s, the public sector was gradually 
restructured and consequently reduced in the banking sector, as well as in public utilities like 
telecommunications (the Greek Telecommunications Organization- OTE) and electricity (the 
Greek Public Power Corporation- DEI). 57  This public sector retrenchment through gradual 
privatization represented a reversal of the entire post-war policy paradigm58. Direct political 
control was also gradually reduced and detached by the restructured public corporations. This 
can be perceived by the relevant legislation, which allowed and assisted public corporations to 
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operate in a more managerial way.59 The scope of the legislation was on the one hand, to grant 
public corporations flexibility over specific managerial functions, namely personnel and 
financial management, and on the other hand, to curb the rigidity associated with the public 
sector, the aim of which was the operation of public corporations as private corporations. 60 
Although there was a drastic reduction of state-held shares in public corporations, however the 
government, as a major shareholder, directly or indirectly supervises their operation, keeping 
for itself the management of such corporations.61     
On the other hand, the two Simitis governments of 1996-2000 and 2000-2004 redrew 
public-private sector boundaries. State intervention in the economy has also been reduced, 
whilst public employment itself has not been affected.  More recently, there has been an 
intensive promotion of private-public partnerships at all levels- national, sectoral, local.62  
 
vi. Decentralization reforms 
The introduction of the Law 1622/1986 63  in the Greek State was a reform of major 
political importance, meaning that for the first time, in 1986, 2ndtier local self-government was 
introduced.64 Following many amendments as well as political hesitations, prefecture elections, 
finally, took place in 1994.65 The 1994 elections were connected with the establishment of a 
second-tier local government, in which an elected prefect replaced the traditional government 
appointee, who was usually nominated by the governing party.66 Additionally, in obedience to 
the Law 2539/1997,67 in 1997-1998, the other major reform, which increased the efficiency and 
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effectiveness of local government, was the compulsory merger of first-tier local government 
units. Analytically, the numerous and weak in terms of power, resources as well as 
responsibilities-boundaries of municipal authorities (approximately 6,000) were redrawn. 
Consequently, until 2010-2011, there were 1,034 municipal authorities. 68  Under these two 
reforms, the levels of prefecture and municipal government were repositioned vis-à-vis the 
central government. Similarly, they opened the way for the country's 13 regions reform.69 
 
As far as regional authorities are concerned, under the authority of a political appointee, 
they had initially been limited to planning activities. Moreover, they had been connected with 
the policy priorities of the Ministry of Economy with greater particularity to the management of 
European regional programs.70 Their 1998 reform involved the strengthening and widening of 
their decision-making scope. The regional authorities remained de-concentrated units under the 
power of a government appointee until 2010-2011, where the major regional government re-
organization reform was in progress.71 
 
These reforms, which were of major importance, have changed the center-periphery 
relations. However, the real policy-making capacity of the regional authorities seemed to 
remain restricted as the elected prefects' jurisdictions and funds seem also relatively restricted 
in terms of their powers.72 According to the IMF report,73 the impact of central government is 
still significant on the local one. 
 
vii. Agencification 
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The emergence of a new generation of single issue, decentralized and specialized public 
organizations was outside the formal boundaries of the public sector. 74  Those newborn 
organizations have taken the form of a ‘joint stock company’, in which the state has the role of 
the only or the major shareholder. The majority of these organizations operates under private 
law, accomplishes new missions and targets, and disposes of increased autonomy as well as 
resources to counteract bureaucratic stagnation.  There is no state agencies’ contribution in the 
administrative capacity building; however, those agencies possibly improve (short-term) 
efficiency.75 During the late 1990s, the creation of regulatory authorities, being at arm’s length 
from ministries, was intended to regulate liberalized sectoral markets, for instance, 
telecommunications, postal services, and energy.  Nevertheless, such authorities have not been 
sufficiently liberated from the ministries on the grounds that they are involved in the policy 
areas. The government of the day has a total influencing control of the management of these 
authorities, leveraging their appointments, allocation of funds, and priority setting, in addition 
to ratifying their decision.76    
 
viii. Introduction of new managerial techniques 
Since the late 1980s, the training courses for civil servants have included human 
resources development and management skills. However, there is a great difficulty in assessing 
whether an administrative unit operates with heightened efficiency when its personnel has been 
through in-service training.77 The main problem of that difficulty is due to the fact that the 
public administration is lacking in preparation as well in managerial operation. For instance, 
trainees have no possibilities and opportunities to implement the learned techniques at a larger 
scale than their own unit. The introduction of the Law 3230 in 2004 78  established the 
management by objectives and performance measurement. Furthermore, in central and regional 
public administration, the Law also provided for the creation of quality and efficiency units, 
being no operational yet. The prevailing legalistic culture and the lack of preparation of the 
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public administration constitute a framework, which does not allow the adaption of changes, 
and thus managerial reforms seem rather symbolic.79   
 
B. Management of Reform Process and Decision Making on Reforms 
To sum up, the Ministry of Interior was pertinent for the introduction of administrative reforms, 
which are of high profile importance. Some of the accomplished ones are: 
 
 The merger of local government units 
 The emergence of the second-tier of local government 
 Reforms in the recruitment system  
 The civil service code 
 The citizen- administration relations 
 The simplification of administrative procedures 
 The establishment of new independent authorities 
 
However, the procedure of implementing reforms, for instance the internal reorganization 
of ministries, the simplification of the administration or the promotion of new operational 
methods, proves the weakness of the above-mentioned ministry.  
 
Nonetheless, during the period 2004-2008, the Ministry of Finance has noticeable 
intruded into administrative reform policies, becoming a major reform area. Public sector 
liberalization, personnel issues, changes in the legal status of public corporations are some of  
the reform initiatives discretely initiated within the alleged Ministry as well in line ministries 
(e.g agencification).80  
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Ministers, including former Ministers of Finance of ND and PASOK, were often 
technocrats, creating close links between academia and politics and entering academia to 
politics.81  On the other hand, ministers do seek expert advice through consultation with social 
partners and outside experts but not consistently and systematic. Reports solicited from 
international organizations on public health or social insurance, as well opinions voiced by the 
Economic and Social Committee- OKE is a forum of dialogue among social partners- are the 
exceptions that confirm the rule.  
 
Higher civil servants usually have knowledge of legal restrictions rarely expertise in other 
fields. On the other hand, top administrative officials have a mostly secondary role.82  
 
C. Conclusion 
The pre- crisis period is described as the beginning of the stabilization model.83 Along 
with institutional modernization, which was of paramount importance, a significant turnaround 
in the strategy of state expansion was the undertaking of a wide privatization program, which 
can be explained by European integration requirements.84 The public sector became a major 
reform area. However, the administrative changes outlined above were only incremental. 
Despite the fact that the 2001 entry of Greece in the EMU was of paramount importance to the 
liberalization of the economy and the continuing growth of the state, thus the public debt 
increased, and thus, the crisis broke out.  
 
The emergence of a new administrative paradigm did not occur on the grounds that the 
results of the processes of Europeanization have been rather poor. Tendencies to convergence 
as well as to inertia have been some of the reasons for those poor results. Inertia has been 
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scrutinized in a large amount within various policy areas such as pension, administrative 
reform, and the policy area of environmental policy change. 85  Furthermore, factors, for 
instance, political institutional capacity, policy legacies, and policy preferences are some of the 
main obstructing factors of both, the Europeanization of Greek policies, and of Greece’s reform 
capacity. However, the crisis came to reverse the situation.   
 
To sum up, political context along with past arrangements among political elites, public 
sector unions, and corps of public employees closely shape administrative reforms. But, 
‘comprehensive administrative reform is only a small fraction of administrative changes’ ,86 
‘while persistence and successive reform attempts may prove to make a difference over a longer 
time period.’87 Although the electoral promise of wholesale reform has remained constantly 
unfulfilled in Greece, some reforms, however, came to break Greece's path dependency to some 
extent; some others are coming in the next few years (part II). The pursued reforms are the 
following: 
 
1. The attempt of piecemeal privatization and the introduction of new managerial methods 
in public corporations; 
2. Since the mid-1990s, the creation of independent administrative authorities; 
3. Since the early 1990s, the process of decentralization and the transfer of competences 
from central to regional and local government; 
4. The institutionalization of the participation of social partners in decision-making 
processes; 
5. The enhancement of citizens’ rights and the establishment of new contact points 
between citizens and administration. 
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 The Greek state and society is the result of both, a symbiosis of traditional and modern 
elements and the mirror of its wider context. 
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PART II: The administrative reform from 2007 to 2017 
 
Introduction 
For a rather long period of time, Greek bureaucracy has been in such a state of affairs. 
Worth mentioning here is that Spyridon Eulamblos, the author of the ‘Maladministration in 
Greece’ (1894), was even then talking about the Greek crisis of bureaucracy, the deficiencies, 
and pathologies of the state, which he thought could be redressed and overcame by wide radical 
reform and modernization.88 An open secret among professionals, academics, as well as, the 
public is the fact that the Greek administrative system is undergoing a crisis. The effort to 
identify the symptoms and the means of redress led to a number of official reports, also 
addressed to the so-called country’s biggest malady.89 No great difference in the diagnosis 
among these reports is detected, nor as far as the reform recommendations are concerned.  
 
In the public sector, governmental activities are commonly perceived as inefficient by 
international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund90. Thus, 
key priorities for every country is the public administration reform, and particularly, the 
improvement of efficiency, as well as effectiveness. 91  Efficient and effective public 
administration guarantees the optimal utilization of the engaged by public bodies resources, as 
well as, the allocation of excessive public funds either to the society or to actions aiming at 
boosting the economy. Public administration reform, according to the United Nations, 92 
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includes changes in the organizational structure of public administration, the human resources 
management, and also the public finance, as well as decentralization, regulatory reforms, and 
results-based management. This part underlines changes in the Greek public administration’s 
organizational structure, after the outbreak of the crisis, the role of the crisis, as well as the 
power of the internal (bureaucracy, functioning and structures of administration, personnel 
professionalism, etc.) and external (crisis, Troika, politics, political control and party 
dominance, etc.) factors.  
 
A. The role of the Crisis and the ‘Troika’ 
The current international economic and political situation, namely the international 
economic crisis, that many countries globally experienced and others still experiencing it is 
described, as mentioned in the first part, as a critical juncture for Greece, leading to various 
reforms. Concerning the necessity of the reforms, there are two dimensions in the Greek 
governmental discourse: the global and the European. Specifically, during the Papandreou 
government, the global dimension and more specifically the reaction of the global financial 
markets was and still is perceived as the tip of the iceberg, which almost caused the collapse of 
the Greek economy.93 The 2008 economic crisis was presented as the absolute push for reform. 
On the other hand, the European dimension was presented as the solution to the problem via the 
first Memorandum of economic and financial policies, agreed between the Greek government, 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB).94  
 
The first wave of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, caused by the collapse of the American 
investment Bank Lehman Brothers, was succeeded by the second wave, that of governments’ 
budget deficits, as well as, of their ability to repay them.95 Greece was the first country to seek 
financial assistance from the European Union in February 2010. A new, unparalleled phase of 
the euro crisis strategy extended due to the combination of the EU with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) aiming at offering Greece, in May 2010, a loan tied to tough conditions 
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for covering its sovereign debt. 96 Though, as the debt crisis extended to Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain, and Cyprus, the EU was obliged, once again, to implement the strategy with other 
member governments. 97  A new context for a conditionality strategy with significant 
implications at both the European and domestic levels has been formed; additionally, the 
implications concern the short and long term.98 Since its creation, that was the most difficult 
situation in which the Eurozone found itself. At the end of 2009, the severity of the Greek 
economic crisis became apparent, when financial rating agencies downgraded their credit rating 
for Greece, realizing the Government that it was unable to serve its massive debts.99  
 
 
Analytically, the crisis of Greece required a bold new step from the EU. For the purpose 
of circumventing the ‘no bail-out’ Maastricht Treaty rule, a rescue loan was extended, in May 
2010, to Greece. 100  The funding derived from both other EU governments rather than the 
Eurozone institutions themselves and amounted to €110 billion, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) of the amount of  €30 billion.101 Along with the loan came a Memorandum of 
Understanding specifying the conditions to be met for justifying continued issuance of the 
funding over quarterly installments. A team of ‘Troika’ officials coming from the EU 
Commission, the European Central Bank, as well as the International Monetary Fund, has the  
monitoring of this condition. 102  The Memoranda clearly specified public services reforms; 
additionally, in that particular moment, the exogenous pressure was high.103 This phase was 
described as the most coercive of Greece’s Europeanization since its entry in the European 
Union in 1981.104. In December 2010, and May 2011, Ireland and Portugal, respectively, signed 
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similar Memoranda.105 The Irish Memorandum hardly mentions public administration reforms, 
whereas Portuguese Memorandum is much less intrusive in the public administration 
reforms.106  
 
The second bailout for Greece finalized in March 2012 reinforced the supervision of the 
Troika, involving a major ‘haircut’ on foreign private creditors.107 Since then, the EU had never 
before such close supervisory responsibilities concerning one of its member states. The 
creation, in August 2011, of an EU Taskforce for Greece by the EU Commission extended the 
alleged responsibilities of the EU aiming at offering support for domestic institutional reforms 
designed to enhance the receipt and effective use of EU funding. 108  The total financial 
assistance of the second programme released by the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) was €141.8; however, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) returned to the 
EFSF €10.9 billion. The duration of the second programme was initially estimated to last until 
2014; however, the period was later extended to 30 June 2015.109 
 
On 8 July 2015, the official request for stability in the form of a government loan for the 
Economic Stability Mechanism (ESM) made by Greece was for meeting its debt obligations 
and ensuring the stability of the financial system. 110  Thus, on 19 August 2015, the third 
economic adjustment program started for Greece and was scheduled to run until the 20 August 
2018.111 The ESM, under the program, provided Greece with a financial assistance of up to €86 
billion.112 The conditions for receiving that assistance included a number of measures as well as 
reforms that Greece has committed to implementing for addressing its current economic 
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challenges. The reforms agreed in the 3rd Memorandum of Understanding can be grouped into 
four main strands:113 
 Restoring fiscal sustainability 
 Safeguarding financial stability 
 Implementing reforms conducive to growth and jobs 
 Modernizing the government sector 
 
Among other agreed conditions, Greece has committed making full use of the available EU 
technical assistance for designing the reforms.114 The new Structural Reform Support Service 
(SRSS) of the European Commission coordinated such technical assistance.115  
Unlike the two first Memoranda, the third one promoted the drastic overhaul of the Greek 
public revenue system through the complete removal of the system from the direct, as well as, 
from the unmitigated influence of the Minister of Finance.116 
 
B. Memoranda of Understanding and Public Administration Reforms 
Among the implementation of structural policies given to Greece and referred to the 
context of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policy, was the responsibility of 
modernizing the public administration,117 aiming at containing expenses and improving the 
effectiveness of public services. During the period of the three agenda-setting memoranda and 
many follow-up reviews, until August 2018, successive Greek governments had been obliged to 
agree, and thus adopt a very specific listing of the required administrative reforms for satisfying 
the terms of its bailout loans. All in all, the most important entailed: 
 The need for increasing the operational efficiency; enhancement of the available 
data’s quality; the better use of information technology (IT); more effective 
coordination between state organizations; 
                                                          
113 European Council, Council of the European Union, “Greece: the third economic adjustment programme”, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/financial-assistance-eurozone-members/greece-programme/ , accessed 21/08/2018.  
114 Op. cit. 
115 Op. cit.  
116  UACES 46th Annual Conference, 507 September 2016, London, available at: 
https://www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1601/dimitrakopoulos_2.pdf , accessed 29/08/2018, p. 16. 
117 Law No. 3845/2010 concerning “the measures to be taken for the implementation of the support mechanism for the Greek 
economy by the Euro area Member States and the International Monetary Fund”. 
 29 
  The empowerment of the autonomy of the key parts of the administration from 
political manipulation as well corruption (e.g., in the tax revenue administration); 
 The introduction of performance management, the shedding of posts, and the 
development of a human resources strategy; 
 A modern performance assessment system 
 The review/ reexamination of current state provisions in certain key areas aiming 
at evaluating the performance outcomes in relation to resource commitments;  
 Modernization of recruitment procedures 
 Privatizations 
 Justice  
 Improved mobility in the public sector for promoting better use of resources; and, 
 The opening-up of the administration to external review as well as technical 
advice and support (Economic Adjustment Programs for Greece 2010-2013). 
 
All but possibly the first had the potential to shift the Greek administrative model. 
 
i. General Secretariat for Public Revenue Administration and IT tools 
The increasing of the efficiency and effectiveness in budget management was the 
immediate priority in Athens, and this meant new ways of tacking endemic problems. Firstly, 
reform and improvement proved limited and slow. The creation of a new General Secretariat 
for Public Revenue Administration aimed at administering all direct taxation. 118  The EU 
Commission remarked, in February 2011, the poor quality of available data to the government 
of Greece: ‘monthly data availability for the government entities other than the state remains 
clearly below par and prevents adequate monitoring of intra-year budgetary developments for 
the government as a whole’. 119  The introduction of new IT tools in every tax office was 
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instigated, overcoming antiquated practices and rigidities as well as streamlining the system.120  
 
ii. New Specialized Organizational Units, Anti-Corruption Procedures, Codes  
However, increasing effectiveness also indicated greater protection against political 
interference as well as against the corruption of officials, features endemic to the model of 
Greece.121 The creation of new specialized organizational units was of vital importance for 
confronting the tax evasion, which was mainly realized by the high-wealth individuals and large 
taxpayers, being an administrative lacuna revealed by the public reaction to the severe austerity 
measures.122 Furthermore, the strengthening of anti-corruption procedures, the establishment of 
new protocols, the so-called codes, on tax procedures aimed at addressing endemic problems of 
exemptions and discretion, the abolition of cash payments in tax offices and the administration 
of the tax collection only in the largest tax offices,123 were some of the implemented reforms. 
Regarding the anti-corruption procedures, the authorities continued to implement the Strategic 
Plan in full and in line with its timeline.124  By March 2018, the anti-corruption plan was 
updated, and by April 2018 included a commitment to assess the implementation of the Code of 
Conduct of members or Parliament; additionally, by June 2018, was revised.125 The updated 
plan also includes the creation of a monitoring mechanism of a selection of important financial 
crimes. Corruption and money laundering cases are notably included with the object to build a 
credible track-record of prosecuting and sanctioning such crimes.126 The authorities, following, 
will continue to pursue technical support with the European Commission SRSS in the fields of 
anti-corruption. 127  The Greek Parliament passed Law 4369/2016 128  the main objectives of 
which were to tackle the problem of politicization of the public administration and bureaucracy, 
as well as, to introduce modern staffing policies for restoring shaken confidence in public 
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institutions.129 A new permanent mobility scheme was introduced, in which the use of job 
descriptions linked to an online database, including all current vacancies, was promoted. This 
should rationalize the allocation of resources and staffing across the general government.130   
In some instances, the procedures provided for by Law 4369/2016 have been problematically 
implemented. More specifically, regarding the Selection Process of Administrative Secretaries, 
Deputy Administrative Secretaries, Sectoral and Special Sectoral Secretaries, the calls for 
expressions of interest were not issued by a central authority such as the Higher Staff Selection 
Council (ASEP) in a transparent manner and uniform criteria but were made by each Ministry 
with a large discrepancy regarding the required qualifications. Pursuant to article 7 of Law 
4369/2016, responsible for the procedure for the evaluation of the qualifications of the 
candidates for Administrative Secretaries, Deputy Administrative Secretaries, Sectoral and 
Special Sectoral Secretaries is the Special Administrative Selection Board (ESED) which 
includes three members of ASEP. The ESED is the only body competent to receive all the 
applications and the evidence of the candidates' qualifications and then, following the relevant 
evaluation procedure, to announce the three leading candidates. The Ministers select the 
Secretary-General of his choice out of the three leading candidates. At the request of four (4) 
Ministers of the Government, ASEP sent them copies of all candidates' qualifications for 
Administrative and Sectoral Secretaries.  This is in breach of Article 7 of Law 4369/2016 which 
aims at achieving a fair, meritorious and objective system of choice. 
In addition, according to article 8 of Law 4369/2016, the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, 
Governors, Deputy Governors and the general heads of legal entities governed by public law 
(NPDD) and private law legal entities (NPID) whose government belongs to the Government 
are placed exclusively from the Registry of Public Executives after the publication of a call for 
expressions of interest and in accordance with the relevant procedure for the selection of the  
National Register of Line Managers of the Public Administration. According to the law, from 
the beginning of the National Register's operation, the filling of any vacant position should have 
been done through this procedure. Although the Register has been operational since October 
2016, the Government continued to fill vacancies without complying with the intended 
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selection procedure. In accordance with Article 13, in all cases, the term of office of all 
executives expired on 30 June 2018 and therefore after that date all posts would have to be 
filled by persons through the Register. Instead, the Government, by an amendment adopted in 
July 2018, amended Article 13 of Law 4369/2016 by extending the term of office of the 
executives until 31 December 2018 and postponing the filling of posts through the Register 
procedure for 2019. The Institutions agreed to the extension. 
  
The dysfunctionalities of the tax administration outlined a major challenge. In the first half of 
2013, there was an increase by 34% in recouping of old tax debts;131 however, the overall tax 
revenue collection still remained below target. Over a third of the tax’s debt €60 billion was in 
the form of fines for violating/breaking corporate tax regulations, the regulation of which was 
considered highly unlikely.132 The number of the employed tax auditors remained woefully 
inadequate, and the level of the implied audits well below target. The Troika lamented that the 
staff required a re-orientation towards priorities, some of which were the large debtors and the 
large taxpayers units. In 2013, there was still a need for a huge effort to make the administration 
fit for purpose.133 
 
iii. Independent Agencies, Regulatory Bodies and Entities 
Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) is an independent agency from 2010 and is fully 
respected by the Government in carrying out its tasks as well providing high-quality statistics in 
a timely manner. For that reason, the government continues implementing necessary reforms 
and investigates all the support possibilities to provide ELSTAT with adequate human 
resources, and thus, sufficient financial means, and will continue providing effective access to 
administrative data.134 Additionally, the government committed safeguarding the independence 
and the effectiveness of the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) in line with EU 
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requirements. 135  By April 2018, under Article 45 of Law 4001/2011, the authorities, in 
agreement with the institutions, adopted/amended any primary and secondary legislation, 
including the Internal Operation Rules of Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) for being in 
line with the results of the horizontal review on independent agencies.136 Similarly, under Law 
4199/2013, the authorities, in agreement with the institutions, adopted/amended any primary 
and secondary legislation of Regulatory for Passenger Transport (RAEM).137 As far as the 
transport modes are concerned, road, railways, air, maritime, and multi-modal, including 
logistics aspects, the authorities have launched a general transport master plan for Greece 
covering all transport modes; additionally, they have appointed a steering committee as well as 
a project team for the preparation and monitoring of the master plan.138   
 
iv. Change of Personnel Policy and Practice 
The most challenging to the established administrative model part of the reform agenda 
was that involving a change of personnel policy as well as practice. The Troika attempted ‘a 
comprehensive human resources strategy within the Greek administration’- indicating that none 
existed previously- covering ‘the selection process to the hiring and allocation, evaluation, 
training, disciplinary procedures and the roles of the senior managers’. 139  Moreover, the 
Troika also required Greece to embark on ‘the assessment of personnel competences and 
performance’ across the state administration.140 By May 2013, progress had been very limited; 
nevertheless, rather optimistically, by the end of the year, the Troika expected completion. 
Performance management is a concept alien to the Napoleonic tradition and confronted a 
system of accountability that is formal and legalistic, controls of which are often applied ex-
ante, and thus limiting the scope for managerial decision.141   
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v. Reduction of the Administrative Staff 
Additionally, from March 2011 onwards, a highly charged issue of confrontation with 
Athens became the insistence of reducing the total staffing levels of the Greek state 
administration.142 The protection of the public servants by the Greek Constitution made the 
issue of their dismissal challenging.  
The Greek government proved unable for delivering the promised to the Troika downsizing.143 
Repeatedly the Troika left Athens unsatisfied; Troika was not prepared to sanction the next loan 
installment.144 Subsequently, in June 2013, the then coalition took precipitous actions, such as 
the closing of the state-broadcasting corporation, ERT, followed by the exit of the leftist 
DIMAR party from the government.145 In reality, the issue had a much longer history; the EU 
pressure on Greece for reducing posts in the public administration originates not only from pre-
dating the debt crisis but also, even from Greece’s entry into the euro.146 The issue and the 
domestic political constraints remained quite the same; the target reductions conflicted with the 
political interests but also challenged the established administrative model. 
 
Specifically, between 2011 and 2015, the target of the First Greek loan Memorandum 
was the shedding of 150,000 posts, and by the end of 2012, an application of a 1:5 replacement 
rule, as well as many early retirements, led to the loss of almost 80,000 Greek posts.147 In 2011, 
the creation of a so-called mobility scheme,148 under Minister Dimitris Reppas, led to a crude 
shedding of staff due to the imposition of an age criterion and this, along with the staff 
volunteering for early retirement, resulted to the loss of many skilled and experienced personnel 
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at a time that, according to Troika, there was a need for an upgrading of such. 149  The 
subsequent Law No. 4024 (2011) of this mobility scheme specified that the evaluation of 
structural units as well as the personnel is necessary for the rationalization, and particularly, the 
reconstruction of public services by means of the merger of service units, drafting new 
organizational charts of ministerial structures, the transfer of personnel, as well as, the 
abolishment of redundant posts.150 For that reason, in each ministry, a special Committee was 
set up.151 The revision and reactivation of this scheme realized in 2012.152 Although in 2011 
and 2012 there was a change of Government, the country continued to be under the obligation 
of curtailing and downsizing the general government units,153 suggesting that rather little of 
previous obligations had been effectively and efficiently implemented. By November 2012, 
some 2,000 employees were transferred to this mobility scheme and, after political delays, by 
the end of 2013, the government edged towards the target of 25,000.154 There was also a 
pressure to the Greek government to identify staff for mandatory exits from the public 
administration in view of a functional review of the entire central government as well as its 
local offices. It was a delayed exercise that in itself signified a major systemic challenge, 
scheduled for completion in 2013.155 By the end of 2014, the Troika set the target of 15,000 
mandatory exits.156  
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Though the external narrative required systematic review, the actual domestic response 
seemed one of short-term improvisation having the high risk of poor or incomplete 
implementation. For instance, in 2012, a review of publicly funded research centers was 
effectively postponed as the Ministry of Education felt the pressure of making early financial 
savings and implemented a quick-fix reorganization.157 Concerning the public servant posts, 
only later the loan strategy was refined to encompass a more targeted approach aiming at 
rejuvenating and upgrading the human capital, skills as well as performance in the public 
administration;158 put differently, focusing on the models, its needs, and optimum resource 
development.  
 
vi. Privatization 
Privatization can help to make the economy of a country more efficient and contribute to 
reducing public debt. The government along with the Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund (TAIPED) have taken important steps in advancing the privatization programme forward, 
such as the completion of the transaction on the regional airports, the launching of Egnatia 
motorway concession tender, the conclusion of the Piraeus Port (OLP) privatization, financial 
closing of Astir and TRAINOSE; furthermore, they are committed to proceeding with the 
ambitious, ongoing privatization programme of TAIPED.159 The implementation of the agreed 
TAIPED Asset Development Programme, by means of direct sale, securitizations, concessions, 
or other forms of monetization, concerning all its core assets is key for stimulating private 
investment, increasing efficiency, and providing financing to the State. 160  For maintaining 
investors’ interest in key tenders, the Hellenic Republic committed proceeding with the ongoing 
privatization programme.161 The government committed to facilitating the privatization process 
and completed all needed government actions. In this respect, it completed all actions needed as 
agreed on a quarterly basis between TAIPED, the government, and the institutions. The Board 
of Directors of TAIPED has approved the list of the Government Pending Actions, which is 
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attached to the third Memorandum as an Annex. Following, through law 4389/2016, which was 
in line with the statement of the Euro Summit of 12 July 2015, a new privatization and 
investment fund, the Hellenic Corporation of Assets and Participations (HCAP) was 
established. The overarching objective of the Fund was to manage valuable Greek assets; 
furthermore, to protect, create and ultimately maximize their value, which is monetized through 
privatizations and other means. The monetization of the assets was one source to make 
repayments of the new loan of ESM in line with the Euro Summit Statement.162  
 
vii.  Single Payment Authority 
Among the previous administrative reforms is the establishment of a Single Payment 
Authority163aiming at the centralization of all civil servants’ salaries in a unified remuneration 
system that would cover wages as well as allowances of all public sector employees. Full 
implementation of this unified remuneration system was initially planned for September 2011; 
however, relevant law was published at the end of October 2011.164 In January 2012, the actual 
implementation of the law started with the gradual application of the new legislation to different 
categories of public sector employees.  
 
viii. Severity of Penalty Legislation 
      An additional reform announced by the Papandreou government was the increasing of the 
severity of the public sector employees’ penalty legislation in order to achieve better 
accountability.  Consequently, it was expected the minimization of the role of the trade unions. 
The end of the Papandreou government introduced no legislation. In January 2012, a draft law 
was finally sent to Parliament.165  
 
ix. E-Procurement and Independent Authority  
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As far as the public procurement is concerned, the initial planning of the e-procurement 
for all sectors and levels of the government was for the end of 2011; however, the contract for 
the provision of the electronic platform had still not been signed in July 2011.166  In February 
2011, the consultation for the establishment of an independent authority overseeing public 
procurement was finalized.167  Following, the draft law was sent to Parliament and, in August 
2011, was voted. 168  That reform in the field of procurement aimed at improving the 
transparency and accountability of the contracts between the public and private sectors. Clearly, 
the Papandreou government did not manage to finalize this reform.169  
 
x. The Cl@rity Program 
Additionally, the government clearly agreed to the ensuring of public spending 
transparency by publishing online all public-spending decisions. Via the Cl@rity program, 
indeed, all public entities’ decisions should be published online and no implementation is 
allowed unless they are uploaded on the Clarity website.170 The Interim report171acknowledged 
progress in this field. Interestingly, the government moved one step forward from the 
prescriptions of the first Memorandum and made compulsory the online publication of all 
decisions, regardless of the public spending character.  
 
xi. The Local Administration Reform- Kallikratis 
Regarding the local administrative reform, the requirement was the adoption of 
legislation reforming local government by June 2010.172 The implementation of a law, which 
incorporated prefectures into regions, reduced the number of those regions from 76 to 13 and 
simultaneously reduced municipalities from 1034 to 325 as well as municipal enterprises from 
6000 to 1500 started. The reform has been named Kallikratis. Kallikratis is one of the reforms 
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implemented at a fast pace and its keys aims were to minimize cost, and also, to improve the 
provided by the local government results of the services. It reshuffled the responsibilities 
between local governments and regions.173   
  
xii. Justice 
The authorities implemented a three-year strategic plan (2015-2018) regarding the 
improvement of the functioning of the judicial system. The plan encompasses key actions 
aimed at enhancing judicial efficiency, addressing shortcomings in the functioning courts, 
speeding up judicial proceedings, for instance, the collection of information on the situation of 
the courts, computerization, as well as, the development of alternative means for dispute 
resolutions, such as mediation, rationalization of the cost of litigation and the improvement in 
court functioning and court management.174  
 
xiii. A Better Regulation Agenda 
A Better Regulation Agenda aiming at ensuring the reduction of administrative burdens 
on citizens and enterprises, given for consultation in August of 2011, finally voted in February 
2012.175 It introduced the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and was in line with the OECD 
Better Regulation Agenda. No change was observed during the Papandreou government. 
Nevertheless, the new law introduced new policy instruments for the improvement of 
regulation.176  
A significant number of RIAs were produced in 2010 (out of 68 laws presented to the 
Parliament, 48 had a RIA). The results were mixed. While some RIAs are of reasonably good 
quality, most of them are narrow in scope and suffer from the lack of both expertise and data. 
Most Ministries do not have adequately skilled human resources for developing high-quality 
impact assessments. In addition, because of the lack of extended, reliable and readily accessible 
databases on social, economic and environmental issues and policy outcomes, the factual 
information available to ministries’ staff is often too limited for them to realistically assess the 
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impact of regulations. By the end of 2010, only one-third of the RIAs accompanying draft laws 
contained quantitative data on the relevant issue. The cost of gathering consistent data is, in 
itself, sufficient to hamper the adoption of RIAs as a meaningful tool for policy elaboration. 
The challenge, however, goes beyond technical issues of expertise and data availability. The 
adoption of an evidence-based approach to policymaking amounts to paradigm change for 
Greece’s central administration and political personnel. Casual evidence suggests that the 
preparation of RIAs can be subject to important political interferences and that RIAs are 
perceived not as a tool for developing appropriate and proportionate measures, but as a formal 
hurdle in a regulation’s approval process. Admittedly, such perceptions are common in many 
other countries. In Greece, however, they are reinforced by the presence of a strong legalistic 
tradition and lack of comfortable co-operative relationship between the political managers and 
the administration.   
 
xiv. Independent Reviews 
There was an agreement via the 2010 Memorandum to perform an independent review of 
the organization as well as the functioning of the central administration with the purpose of 
adopting measures for the rationalization of the use of resources; additional purposes are the 
organization of public administration and the effectiveness of social programs.177  Soon, the 
production of two separate reviews was decided, one for the central government, overseen by 
the Ministry of the Interior, and one for the social programs, overseen by the Ministry of Labor. 
After continuous delays,178 in November 2011, only the review of the central administration 
was published by the OECD. 179  In January 2012, soon after the fall of the Papandreou 
government, a lot of suggestions made by the OECD were incorporated in a White Paper on 
Governance.180 Both, the OECD review and the White paper just made proposals about the 
changes that should happen. However, their suggestions do not vary substantially from what 
has already been discussed for a long time about the necessity of public administration 
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reform. 181  Concluding, during the Papandreou government, no significant change can be 
observed in the central government, one of the most problematic areas of the Greek public 
administration.    
 
xv. Government Administration Restructure, External Review, Technical Advice and 
Support 
Adjacent to these specific areas there was also a more general concern regarding the 
structuring and operation of the government administration. The OECD produced a 
comprehensive report concerning the Greek administration that year, including searing 
indictments of systemic failures and functional weaknesses.182 The EU Commission, individual 
EU member states, particularly France and Germany, the IMF, the World Bank and others, 
provided external technical assistance in specific functional areas.183 The Troika then moved in 
2012 saying that the Government has to: 
i. Set up a high-level transformation steering group, chaired by the PM, aiming at 
supervising, monitoring and ensuring the implementation of administrative 
reforms; (February 2012) 
ii. Establish a stable structure for Inter-Ministerial Co-ordination; (May 2012)  
iii. Create basic horizontal structures in each Ministry, implementing the relevant 
procedures with Budget/Finance (February 2012), Audit, Internal Control, 
Human Resource Management, acting under common rules. (European Economy 
2012) 
 
a. Stable Structure for Inter-Ministerial Coordination and High-level 
Transformation Steering Group 
The effort for reorganizing public administration was maintained. In this respect, and 
taken account of the concrete schedule for the implementation, the establishment of a stable 
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structure for Inter-Ministerial Coordination at the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance was considered as necessary, which would provide better guidance, and 
furthermore, break the intra-Ministry attitude of neglect and inertia.184 Additionally, the setting 
up of a high-level transformation steering group, with the responsibility to ‘supervise, monitor 
and ensure the implementation of administrative reforms’, and under the Prime Minister’s 
authority, was considered equally necessary. So, the setting up of the Governmental Council of 
Administrative Reform took place, the responsibility of which was the policy design for the 
improvement of the organization, functioning, as well as, the effectiveness of public services, 
and of the evaluation of the results achieved and also the decisions taken on them.185  
 
b. External Review 
Moreover, various Committees, comprised of civil servants in the Greek public 
administration, as well as, their colleagues from other European countries, for instance, France, 
in distinct departments of State prepared reports on the reshaping of the internal structure of 
ministries, also further elaborated by the Ministry od administrative Reform and E-
Governance. 186  Additionally, after a certain period of time elapsed by the Governmental 
Council of Administrative Reform, their revision was carried out, and were, finally, approved.  
 
c. Ministerial Structure  
An announced in April 2013 new law and consistent with these objectives envisaged 
streamlining the ministries from 18 to 14, and one secretariat general; it was a restructuring 
which would also facilitate the shedding of staff. Never before had the EU been involved, from 
the very center outwards, in the organizational restructuring of one of its national 
governments.187  
The Government’s option was a new model in the organization and operation of the state and 
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the public administration so that the country can have a rationally organized, functional and 
efficient administrative system that serves the public interest, ensures social cohesion, 
contribute to growth, enhance accountability and control, simplify decision-making, offer 
upgraded services to citizens and businesses, and cost as little as possible. It is noted that the 
abolishment of 1,894 public services and the reduction in the number of allowances for posts of 
responsibility were estimated to save € 6,211,200 per year. Also, the budgetary relief was 
estimated to be much higher by the reduction in operating costs from the restriction of the 
equipment and the offices of General and Special Secretaries, General Managers and Managers 
whose positions were abolished by this law. The reorganization of the Ministries was also due 
to the out-of-date Organizations of Ministries. Many ministries have been operating with the 
same-based organizations since the 1980s. 
 
The 2013 Administrative Reform 
Specifically, the reform for the machinery of government, for instance, the structure of 
ministries and public entities, for attaining the efficiency and effectiveness is one of the key 
objectives of the 2014 Greek National Reforms Program. This program emphasizes the need for 
downsizing the Greek public administration as well as reducing the resources utilized.188 The 
Greek public administration reform regarding the enhancement of the efficiency is a 
fundamental recommendation put forth by the OECD. 189  The 2013 Administrative reform 
(AR2013) aims at reforming the central public administration and, particularity, the Central 
Government Departments (CGDs), by downsizing the structure as well as by reducing the 
number of staff and the allocated to every CGD budget.190 The objectives of the AR2013 
constitute the basis of a more efficient and less costly central administration. According to the 
OECD review of the Central Administration, 191  it has been highlighted that the Central 
Government Departments (CDGs) play a fundamental role, “which are formally responsible for 
the supervision of all other entities of the public sector”. However, as a matter of fact, 
organizational sprawl characterizes the government departments, leading –among others- to the 
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poor quality of the public services and ineffectiveness.192    
 
The Administrative Reform 2013 (AR2013) is one of the most recent reform projects for 
the Greek public administration. In late April 2013, the Ministry of Administrative Reform and 
E-Governance announced the reform’s details. The AR2013 aimed at reforming the State’s 
administrative machinery concerning the central government, adopting the managerial and 
organizational principle of the unity of direction,193 as well as, attaining the appropriate span of 
control194for a more effective public management.    
 
After the government reshuffling of June 24th, 2013, the structure of the government 
machinery in Greece -under the premiership of Mr. Antonios Samaras- was a complex of 
eighteen separate central departments, namely ministries, among which the members of the 
Government were distributed; however, exceptions constitute the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of State, who were not in charge of any specific ministry.195  
 
The composition of the CGDs consists of usually untidy agglomerations of public 
services, as well respective jurisdictions at the central level of the government, the leadership of 
which they have members of the Government, and function with the purpose of the formulation 
and implementation of public interest goals and respective spaces of public policy.196 At the 
central level of the government, the forms and denominations of departments of State delineate, 
and also share basic branches of public services, as in the case in most contemporary, and 
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particularly European countries.197 Regarding the formulation of public policy enclosing the 
design and implementation of the legal and regulatory framework in various public action 
domains, they assume a guiding role.  As a result, government departments represent the 
organization’s of the central administrative machinery of the State most basic pillars and also 
form the most crucial institutional components in the formulation and implementation of the 
public policy process. 198  Thus, unsurprisingly, the greater part of policy-making takes in 
associations with or within them.  
 
According to the historical evolution of the CGDs, 199 they include major institutional 
components in respective policy areas, namely: 
 
 Home administration and security of the State 
 Foreign policy and defense 
 Economic policy 
 Public works and infrastructure 
 Social policy 
 Education 
 National heritage and culture 
 
Despite the time and the political orientations of the social forces that form and vary the size 
and extent of state’s machinery policy composition, respective ministerial or departmental 
structures and services formulate the core element of the Government composition.    
 
The emphasis of the AR2013 is placed on the operational restructuring, downsizing, of 
the following Greek CGDs and Secretariats General:200  
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 Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of Interior 
 Ministry of Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, Transport, and 
Networks 
Heretofore: 
 Ministry of Development and Competitiveness 
 Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport, and Networks 
 Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Culture and Sport 
Heretofore: 
    Ministry of Education and Religion 
    Ministry of Culture and Sports 
    Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance 
    Ministry of Health 
    Ministry of Labor, Social Security, and Welfare 
    Ministry of Rural Development and Food 
    Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Climate Change 
    Ministry of Justice, Transparency, and Human Rights 
    Ministry of Tourism 
    Ministry of Shipping and the Aegean  
    Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace 
    Secretariat General of Information and Communication, and the Secretariat 
General of Mass Media 
 
The scope of the AR2013 was the enhancement of performance, as well as, efficiency and 
control over the expenses of these particular public bodies, along with the reduction of their size 
through the reshaping of their structure, and also the amelioration of the quality of the related 
public services. 201 Additionally, the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance 
regarded it as the basis for the implementation of mobility as well as the dismissal of the 
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redundant civil service staff.202   
 
Having into consideration that the Greek economic crisis is mainly due to fiscal problems, 
the AR2013 was significantly highly important for the Greek economy and public 
administration. Thus, the urgency of this administrative reform and its immediate 
implementation was underlined and made explicit in the reports of the European Commission, 
that viewed the Second Economic Adjustment Program for Greece, as well as in the press 
releases of the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-Governance. 
 
New Structures of the Ministries  
By the end of August 2014, new organization charts of the ministries were issued -in form 
of presidential decrees- and were put in force about two months later- by the beginning of 
November 2014. 203  The announcement of the Ministry of Administrative Reform and E-
Governance concerned the fact that the size of the service units in the ministries overly 
decreased by 40%, leading to a respective reduction of expense. The latter further contributed to 
the efficiency and effectiveness improvement in public administration. Probably, contracting 
the structure of the services facilitates the coordination of the units.204 Furthermore, the need for 
drastic administrative structure reduction in the central level of governance, along with the 
rationalization of their internal organization for achieving increased administrative productivity 
were underlined in the OECD Review for Greece.205  
 
  In the restructuring of the organizational charts process by the then Government of 2014, 
an effort was made in order certain concrete principles of organizational rationality to taken into 
consideration.206 Therefore, it was expected that the criteria of internal differentiation of the 
ministries would pursue the principles of unity of direction, the unity of command, as well as the 
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optimization of span control.207 Concerning the unity of direction, it is worth mentioning that 
there was a merge of the units of administrative support of the ministries’ central services with 
those of secretaries general, existed in various departments of State. Likewise, the same 
occurred with the service units responsible for matters of finance and information 
technology.208  
 
On the other hand, as far as the span of control within the country’s central administrative 
structure is concerned, the Ministry of Administrative Reform has identified it as a particularly 
“problematic aspect of the Greek central administration”.209 For instance, in one out of five 
sections, the head of the respective unit had no subordinate employees at all, whereas, one on 
three sections has only one employee.210 
 
Nevertheless, the regarding the whole effort criticism that has been exerted has indicated 
that the reform process seems to be rather fragmentary. It has especially emphasized the 
numerical reduction of the service units without taking into consideration the necessary extent 
of the functional complementarity of administrative units and the overlapping of competencies 
within the same ministries and even among different ministries.211 Furthermore, the existing 
government scheme at that time formed the restructuring; however, without examining the 
possibility of each reform in the direction of reducing the number of ministries themselves or 
alternatively, an agglomeration of various sectors of public policy.212 Otherwise, the internal 
restructuring of particular ministries, part of a rather extended or fragmented governmental 
structure, namely comprised of a rather large number of ministries headed either by full 
ministers or alternate ministers, not to include deputy ministers, appears to have little impact on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Government as a whole.213 That is due to the fact that, 
although the number of CGDs has been reduced, though there is no confrontation of the 
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phenomenon of scattered office locations.214   
 
Besides the Memorandum reforms, a framework law for electronic governance was 
voted;215 furthermore, the completion of the modernized communication system between public 
organizations was announced in the Explanatory Report of the Intermediate Programme. There 
was also a planning for transforming Citizens’ Service Centers into Unified Service Centers for 
both, citizens and enterprises. 216  The creation of an Innovation and Documentation Center 
within the National Center for Public Administration and Local Government was also 
planned. 217  International trends such as decentralization, more flexible human resource 
management, e-governance and above all a campaign to reduce costs are evident in the reform 
program of the past and present governments. Addedly, the pension and the health care reform, 
the plan to reduce school numbers as well as universities, the public enterprises’ privatization 
plans and the recovery plan for the railway sector and for public transport constitute a major 
reform with unintended consequences.218  
 
The 2015 new cabinet of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was much smaller after the 
merging of several ministries into four “super” government bureaus and the creation of a total 
of 19 ministries. Analytically, the tourism portfolio was part of the new Economy, 
Infrastructure, Marine and Tourism Ministry, overseeing development and competitiveness, 
marine and the Aegean, tourism and infrastructure, transport and networks. The Interior and 
Administrative Reconstruction Ministry included the current ministries of the interior, 
administrative reform and e-government, public order and citizen protection and Macedonia 
and Thrace. The new Productive Reconstruction, Environment and Energy Ministry 
incorporated the current portfolios of environment, energy and climate change, rural 
development and the services of the general secretariat for industry of the development and 
competitiveness ministry. The new Culture, Education and Religious Affairs Ministry oversaw 
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culture, sport, and education. The health ministry renamed as Health and Welfare Ministry and 
the current labor ministry renamed as Labor and Social Solidarity Ministry and included the 
General Secretariat for Social Security. There were no changes to the foreign, justice and 
defense ministries. 
 
The structure of the second cabinet had several reforms and includes the following 
Ministries: 
 
 Ministry of Interior 
 Ministry of Citizen Protection 
 Ministry of Economy and Development  
 Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media 
 Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs 
 Ministry of Culture and Sports 
 Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Social Solidarity 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights 
 Ministry of Health 
 Ministry of Administrative Reconstruction 
 Ministry of Environment and Energy 
 Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport  
 Ministry of Migration Policy 
 Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Island Policy 
 Ministry of Tourism 
 Ministry of Agricultural Development and Food 
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C. Data Analysis 
It is useful to proceed, here, to an analysis of the period described above. To begin with, 
figure 1 exhibits the overall trend in administrative reform actions within the period 2007-2013, 
as recorded by the Greek Ministry.219 The resultant graph exposes a relatively low and stable 
level of activity during the pre-crisis period up to 2009. In 2010, following the election of a new 
government, prime minister of which was George Papandreou, in October 2009 as well as in 
May 2010, in the onset of the list of reform items of the bailout Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) a major increase occurs in the number of such actions. Indeed, the continued increase in 
the trend led to more than fivefold in 2012. Aggregately, this trend offers confirmation of the 
effects of external conditionality.220 
 
However, this is a limited overall measure. It is useful to examine the nature and the 
content of the reforms. In figure 2, there is a differentiation of reform actions by subject type, 
following the Ongaro typology, for the 2007 -2009 pre-crisis period. 221 It is impressive that the 
number of actions regarded to financial management as well as audit and performance is the 
lowest types. Indeed, less than 1:3 is the ration of financial management/audit and performance 
to the other two, personnel and organizational matters. The majority of activities stayed 
seemingly with the existing operational mode; thus, they were not concerned with the 
effectiveness of public spending or, alternately, with the evaluation of performance. The 
‘skewness’ suggests either a detachment or insularity of the state administration regarding 
concerns of delivery or service, as in the New Public Management model or indeed with 
financial discipline. In a period without a crisis, there were little possibilities of changing the 
administrative paradigm for a relatively set path due to the limited pressures. That was 
compatible with the clientelistic favors as well as the rent-seeking demands of Greek politics.222  
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Along with the bailouts came the loan’s conditionality and the specification’s of reforms 
pressures, including administrative changes.223 In an overall perspective, there is an existed 
notice that the administrative measures represented approximately 40% (282) of the total 
number of reforms (706) outlined and required of Greece under the two bailout Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) terms. Apparently, there was a clear recognition concerning the of 
crucial importance Greek state’s administrative reform which was vital to the ability of the 
country to adapt to the Eurozone requirements.    
 
Figure 3 comprises another set of data, selected from the regular reports of the Troika 
between 2010-2013. 224  This indicates the aggregate levels of implemented administrative 
reform actions outlined as well as required by the MoUs and judged by the Troika. The 
categorization of the reform actions is the same as indicated earlier. The graph represents a 
modest progression in the items listed, including a dramatic rise in 2012-2013. Especially, the 
focus of the reforms exhibits a major shift from the pre-existing domestic pattern. Measures 
regarded to the public administration’s audit and performance now loomed large on the 
Troika’s radar. The list of the required reforms here has increased threefold after the Troika’s 
arrival. Additionally, a further major difference was the given attention to the financial 
management, which became a very prominent concern.225 Furthermore, fundamental interest to 
Greece’s creditor has the performance and delivery, as well as budget discipline, and the 
differences in the patterns of reform actions are characteristic of contrasting, external and 
domestic, agendas.226   
 
Figure 4 shows a categorization of the total number of reforms set by the Athens 
government, using, once again, the Ministry’s own data. 227 Contrary to those elaborated by the 
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Troika, there is a surprising lack of emphasis on an audit and performance agenda; thus, the 
relative given attention is minuscule. This is not a Troika’s agenda subject, and therefore the 
Greek government could move on. During the same period, the Troika was lamenting the lack 
of domestic progress. Rather, the administration remained reluctant either to engage in self-
reflection or wider evaluation. In this respect, the agenda had barely changed. Organizational 
items remained the primary agenda. Nevertheless, there was decreasing attention than before in 
personnel matters. A new emphasis put on financial management reforms, the second biggest 
category of all.228   
 
Overall, the data signal a number of important features. To begin with, the overall level of 
activity regarding administrative reform presents a huge increase after the onset of the first 
bailout. Furthermore, there is a significant shift of emphasis from one period to the next as well 
as notable contrasts of priority between the Troika and the government of Greece in terms of 
the focus and the content of reform. Particularly, the external creditors stress the need both for 
new audit and performance measures; though, this is a very low area of activity for the 
government of Greece itself. Certainly, it is actually a lesser activity compared with the pre-
crisis period. The disparity recommends contrasting norms, perhaps also of models. To 
conclude, the reforms of the Greek government show a much stronger focus than before on 
matters of financial management, a priority emphasized by the Troika.  
 
D. Conclusion 
This part assessed the impact of the external and internal conditionality strategy on 
Greece, as well as, the reform of its state administration. In Greece, the aim of the most 
important reforms has been the (re)structure of institutional aspects of the administrative 
system; the administrative system was an area of constant reforms. Primarily, the collected data 
indicated that the aggregate level of administrative reform activity considerably increased after 
the onset of the first bailout, reflecting a generalized will to remaining Greece in the EU’s core. 
Though, delving into the range as well content of the reform actions exhibited blockages and 
differences of agendas. What underlined the agenda of the Troika was a clear assumption of the 
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failure of current practices of Greece, a dismissal of the model and its rationality. Also, the 
targets concerning the mobility scheme and mandatory exits had been achieved. Generally 
speaking, the alternating governments have adopted a new administrative reform action plan for 
eight years, encompassing a comprehensive human resources strategy. Though, very substantial 
improvements in public administration [were] still needed for enhancing the quality and 
efficiency;229 thus, this would require the shifting of personnel, performance evaluation, as well 
as, better financial management, the simplification of rules, and also, the reduction of the scope 
for corruption.   
 
Although the 2008 economic crisis was the absolute push for reform, a reluctance was 
still existed to embrace organizational change, generally appeared within the dominant 
administrative culture. Instead, traditional ways of organization as well operation demonstrated 
in a legalistic mentality and a low interest in, and development of modern types of skills within 
the civil service, seem to characterize this culture. Hence, the intensification of political control 
and its domination over the state bureaucracy tends in the longer term to undermine the steady 
development and professional advancement conditions in the administrative structure and 
culture (e.g. Meritocracy). Consequently, crisis phenomena tend to perpetuate themselves; thus, 
the need for more political intervention and control is dramatically increasing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
229 European Economy (2014), “The second adjustment programme for Greece. Fourth review” – April 2014, Occasional 
Papers 192, Luxembourg: Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, EU Commission, p. 3. 
 55 
PART III: A Comparative Study of Greece and Portugal 
 
Introduction 
This part analyses as well as compares the impacts of the adjustment programs on the 
public administration in Greece and Portugal. The principal purpose is to examine the 
similarities and differences in the reform patterns and the results of the implemented policies 
between the two cases. An important issue to be approached is the consequence of the reform 
programs on the performance of the public administration, both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms. This part also investigates certain explanatory factors for the observed differences.  
 
Greece and Portugal provide a good basis for comparison on the grounds that they share 
certain similar historical, political, economical as well as social characteristics.230 Additionally, 
their administration has been formed under the influence of a common tradition originated from 
the Napoleonic administrative pattern.231 In comparison to other EU countries, the crisis has 
most severely hit these countries, which were obliged to implement relatively similar programs, 
memoranda, of fiscal and structural reforms.  Consequently, they represent two critical cases of 
‘externally imposed conditionally’,232 which led to domestic reforms. 
 
A.  Administrative Tradition and Reform Trajectories 
Greece and Portugal can be categorized in the cluster of the Southern European countries, 
which form a distinct administrative paradigm largely originating from the Napoleonic 
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tradition.233  Besides the historical, sociopolitical, economic as well as cultural similarities,234 
similarities in their administrative systems have also characterized the southern bureaucracies. 
The centralized, as well as the hierarchical organization of the administrative apparatus, the 
political accountability of the bureaucracy, the legalistic culture, the procedures-based 
orientation, the civil service career-based system and also the corporatist relations between the 
state, and society, are some of the fundamental typical features observed among southern 
European countries. 235  Thus, these features often coexist with weaknesses, namely 
politicization party patronage, clientelism, informal arrangements, low institutional capacity as 
well corruption, in the administrative practice.236    
 
Similar organizational structures along with the common administrative heritage 
characterize the Greek and Portuguese states. A unitary and decentralized system of 
government is encountered in both countries. Three main levels, namely the central, the 
decentralized and the local government, compose the Greek public administration. The 
Portuguese public administration includes direct and indirect state administration and 
autonomous bodies. These main administrative tiers are segmented into regions, communities, 
municipalities and other administrative/territorial areas.237  
                                                          
233 Peters, G. (2008), “The Napoleonic tradition”, International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(2), 118-135; Spanou, 
C. (2008), “State reform in Greece: responding to old and new challenges”, International Journal of Public Sector Management, 
21(2), 150-173; Ongaro, E. (2014), “The relationship between the new European governance emerging from the fiscal crisis and 
administrative reforms: qualitatively different, quantitatively different, or nothing new? A Plea for a Research Agenda”, 
Administrative Culture, 15(1), 10-20; See Introduction, p. 6-8. 
234 Sotiropoulos, D. (2004), Southern European public bureaucracies in comparative perspective, West European Politics, 27(3), 
405- 422, available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000228077 , accessed 6/6/2018; Kickert, W. (2011), Distinctiveness 
of administrative reform in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, Common characteristics of context, administrations and reforms, 
available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01862.x , accessed 6/6/2018, Public Administration, 89(3), 801-818. 
235  Sotiropoulos, D. (2004), “Southern European public bureaucracies in comparative perspective”, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000228077 , accessed 6/62018, West European Politics, 27(3), 405- 422; Corte-Real, I. 
(2008), “Public management reform in Portugal: successes and failures”, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1108/09513550810855663 , accessed 6/6/2018, International Journal of Public Sector Management, 21(2), 
205–229; Ongaro, E. (2009), “Public management reform and modernization, Trajectories of administrative change in Italy, 
France, Greece, Portugal and Spain”, Cheltenham UK - Northampton, MA USA: Edward Elgar, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849802284 , accessed 6/6/2018; Di Mascio, F. & Natalini, A. (2015), “Fiscal retrenchment in 
Southern Europe: changing patterns of public management in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain”, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2013.790275 , accessed 6/6/2018, Public Management Review, 17(1), 129-148. 
236  Sotiropoulos, D. (2004), “Southern European public bureaucracies in comparative perspective”, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000228077 , accessed 6/6/2018, West European Politics, 27(3), 405- 422; Diamandouros, 
N., Gunther, R., Sotiropoulos, D., Malefakis, E. (2006). Introduction: Democracy and the State in the new Southern Europe. In: 
Gunther, R., Diamandouros, N., Sotiropoulos, D. (eds), Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe (pp.1-41). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199202812.003.0001 , accessed 
6/6/2018.  
237  See Table 1, Appendix, p. 82; Manto Lampropoulou (2017) Administrative Reforms and the Eurozone Crisis: A 
comparative study of Greece and Portugal, PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, pp. 336-361. 
 57 
The eruption of the Eurozone crisis finds Greece and Portugal in the condition of an 
underway-administrative reform programs implementation. Since the mid-1970s, both countries 
pursued similar reform routes. Broader trends, for instance, New Public Management (NMP), 
Governance and the New Weberian State (NWS), influenced these reform paths. Additionally, 
although the public administration itself was not a core EU harmonization field, thus, the 
Europeanization process significantly affected domestic administrative systems, since accession 
to the EU.238 
 
Distinct phases and policies are related to certain reform trajectories. Shortly, 
modernization has been the principal purpose of most reform efforts during the past three 
decades, corresponding to several policy programs and implementation tools. Although 
similarities between Greece and Portugal do exist, the timing, as well as the specific content of 
the reforms do partly vary.239  
 
The introduction of certain managerial and technical tools during the mid-1980s and the 
1990s, following the 1970s democratization phase, aimed at the modernization and 
rationalization of the public sector. Nevertheless, only after the mid-2000s more concrete 
reform programs were initiated, causing notable changes.240 The origins of these programs were 
mostly from governance and New Public Management-related technics intending to reduce the 
size as well as the cost of the public sector, simplify the procedures, rationalize the 
administration, decentralization, better service quality and e-government. 241  The PRACE 
program especially assists in the implementation of radical steps set towards administrative 
reform at central and local government levels, also achieving some savings. 242  Due to 
deteriorating public finances, during the crisis, Portugal had already initiated certain measures 
aiming at reducing the public sector expenditure and introducing financial discipline.243  
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Greece’s democratization phase was more prolonged compared to Portugal and lasted 
until the late 1980s. As explained in the first part,244 the late 1970s to 1980s was the period of 
transition to democracy where special effort, as well as emphasis, was placed on the restoration 
and reinforcement of the democratic institutions of the country, while simultaneously the 
defined by the predominantly centralist bureaucratic style as well as by the ‘heavy’ state 
elements dominant features of the administrative apparatus also existed. In the 1980s, the goal 
of the democratization of the expanding public sector, and later its successor, the democratic 
modernization, guided the administrative reforms resulting in certain institutional changes.245 In 
the early 1990s, a short shift in the political agenda occurred with the initiation of a neo-liberal 
approach to the public sector. No actual implementation was recorded, yet. In the mid-1990s 
and under the influence of the managerial models and the Europeanization process, notable 
efforts towards modernization and decentralization are underlined. The 1996 introduction of a 
range of economic and managerial reforms had the principal purpose of the technical 
rationalization and the modernization of the administrative apparatus. 246  During the next 
decade, there was a certain degree of continuity in the administrative reforms agenda, yet the 
reform momentum seems to be weaker and the initiated programs to piecemeal 
transformations.247  
 
The importance and the usefulness of this brief description of the pre-crisis reform paths 
are perceived as it is helpful for understanding the relative framework of the Greek and 
Portuguese domestic administrative systems, and thus, their later reaction to the crisis. In both 
cases, the intensity and the scope of the administrative reform were moderate. Thus, the ratio of 
the reform process progressed at a slow pace. Additionally, although models, namely New 
Public Management, New Weberian State, and Governance, have certainly influenced all 
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southern public administrations, no radical changes have occurred to the core aspects of the 
traditional administrative pattern.248   
 
B. The Eurozone Crisis and Policy Responses 
Despite the particularities of each country, Greece and Portugal’s financing problems, 
which led to the request for external assistance, share certain similarities.249 The period that 
crisis erupted finds the fiscal condition of the two countries in a situation of ongoing deficits, 
rising government debt, external imbalances, as well as high borrowing. Particularly, similar to 
other peripheral countries hit by the Eurozone crisis, they recorded prior large current-account 
deficits.250 Greece’s high public sector borrowing, as well as the low revenue, were intensifying 
the country’s fiscal imbalance, leading to the increase of public debt and budget deficit.  In 
Portugal, similar fiscal imbalances emerged, thus of a lower intensity. Furthermore, other 
factors, namely low growth and high private sector leading, coexisted with these imbalances. 
The further aggravation of the crisis impact emanated from the Economic and Monetary 
Union’s existing and deeper structural weaknesses.251   
 
In the crisis scenario, there was a relation between the role of the public administration 
and its size, as well as the cost, of the public sector. Therefore, the public expenditure reduction 
through downsizing and cost-cutting measures constituted a key condition of the subsequent 
fiscal adjustment programs.  In Portugal, the 2011-elected coalition government of Partido 
Social Democrata (PSD) with Centro Democrático e Social (CDS) placed notable emphasis and 
effort on the goal of reducing state’s budget deficit, suggesting that the state should savor 
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‘sacrifices’ rather the citizens as individuals.252 The State Reform program, introduced in late 
2013, heavily criticized state spending and initiated austerity measures, being even related with 
Thacher reforms.253 Similarly, the accusation that the Greek public sector is a major source of 
inefficiency and financial mismanagement justifies the need for drastic cuts.  The decision of 
the subsequent reform programs was taken under mounting fiscal stress. Consequently, that 
decision initiated deep cuts as well as reforms that in some respects were claimed to have 
intensified the ongoing neoliberal agenda.254 
 
The mainly reactive response of the national governments to the crisis and the several 
revisions and adjustments to the initial plans were considered necessary as the crisis unfolded. 
Greece in early 2010, in view of some early warning signs and the deteriorating public finances, 
endeavored to respond in a proactive way through the announcement of austerity measures and 
public sector cutbacks. Thus, the initial underestimation of the severity of the crisis, and on the 
other hand, the mounting of the fiscal pressure, resulted in the inadequacy of these measures for 
reversing its effects.255 The pressure coming from other peripheral courtiers, principally Greece 
and Ireland, led Portugal to initiate a series of measures, the target of which were public sector 
salaries, recruitments, pensions, allowances, as well as health and investment programs, in late 
November 2010, with the aim of reducing the operating expenses of the state within wider 
financial stability.256 The country soon realized the deterioration of the fiscal situation and 
applied for a bailout agreement.257  
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A state of emergency and the direct influence, as well as, oversight of supranational 
institutions formed national policies. The main policy tool for implementing the obligations 
undertaken in exchange for the financial assistance packages was the Economic Adjustment 
Programs, officially embedded in the Memoranda of Understanding. 258  These agreements 
constituted a matter of negotiation between national governments and the Troika, composed by 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). In the Greek case, since 2010, the country has undertaken three adjustment programs 
eight consecutive years; In May 2010, the first assistance program (€72.9 billion) was agreed. 
Following, in March 2012 (€153.8 billion) the second program was agreed, and in August 2015 
(€86 billion) the third one.  Portugal implemented a single financial assistance program (€78 
billion). This program began in May 2011 and lasted three years, till May 2014.259 
 
A combination of structural adjustments and fiscal consolidation measures formed the 
content of the Memoranda.260 Moreover, a list of detailed and mostly front-loaded measures 
decided under the direct involvement of the Troika and on the basis of strict conditionality was 
included in the policy mix.261 Domestic governments’ role in policy formation was weakened; 
thus, a certain degree of policy transfer262 occurred from the supranational to the national level. 
Therefore, especially after the crisis, the public sector reform could hardly be deemed as an area 
of exclusive national competence.263 The decision-making and implementation process were 
realized in a top-down manner, and simultaneously, some aspects of the Europeanization 
process were intensified, such as the adjustments to the harmonized sectors. Additionally, Task 
Force (TFGR) provided also Greece with external technical assistance and expertise from other 
EU countries, for instance, France and Germany.264 
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Under a state of emergency, the intensification of the external involvement occurred, 
while little attention paid to carrying out public debates prior to the decisions.265 Hence, within 
the national context, there was a wide perception that the adjustment programs are forced 
reforms lacking democratic legitimacy.266 Particularly, a large number of the measures related 
to the public sector were initiated in a unilateral way and lacked substantial dialog. 267  In 
Greece, especially, the political controversy over the commitments embodied in the loan 
agreements, the social unrest as well as the protests again the associated austerity measures was 
substantial.268  
 
The fiscal targets and the external obligations stemming from the fiscal consolidation 
packages set the political agenda for administrative reform. Fiscal urgency primarily drove the 
adjustment process and was concentrated on short-term savings.269 Consequently, the goal of 
rationalizing the state spending acquired increased importance. One of the key priorities of the 
administrative reform programs has been the public sector modernization, which was also 
linked with the rationalization, downsizing, and the efficiency goals. 270  In both countries, 
budgetary constraints primarily drove the required adjustments aiming at reducing the cost of 
the administrative apparatus. Additionally, compared with previous reform efforts, the alleged 
were characterized by greater intensity, being compressed in a strict timeframe.271  
 
Both, the bailout agreements (MoUs) and the national programs with reference to public 
administration initiated a series of measures. The classification of the measures is realized in 
three broad categories covering organizational structures, procedures, as well as the civil 
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service. Concerning the structures and the organizational aspects of the public administration, 
the reform programs inaugurated a major restructuring in all levels of the government. 272 
Concisely, they incorporated the reorganization of the central administration, the closing, and 
merging of the public entities, the reduction of the units,273 the reform of the local government 
and, particularly in Greece, a notable decrease concerning the number of municipalities and 
local authorities.274     
 
The strengthening of the financial management and the revenue administration system, as 
well as the improvement of the operational efficiency of the public sector, were the aims of the 
measures targeting administrative functions and procedures. 275  A significant improvement 
towards the use of ICT tools and E-government, such as public procurement system, 
transparency portals,276 as well the citizen service bureaus, has been realized. Additionally, 
there was an observed tendency related to the strengthening of the central levels of government 
and the centralization of the expenditure monitoring. In Portugal, special attention was given to 
the simplification of the procedures and the goal of limiting overlaps between and across 
administrative levels.277 
 
As mentioned several times, civil service has been a major reform area. A wide range of 
measures induced notable changes in the status of public sector employees. Particularly, the 
carrier and remuneration system is a field where changes occurred. New tools have been 
initiated, for instance regarding the special mobility schemes as well as the procedure for the 
selection of senior officers.278 Great emphasis was placed on horizontal cost-saving measures 
encompassing a freeze or reduction of public sector wages as well as pensions, wage cuts, 
allowances and other bonuses, the abolishment or reduction of benefits, limited admissions of 
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new employees, an increase in retirement age, the abolishment of holiday and Christmas 
bonuses, drastic budget cuts in all public entities, and an increase in the weekly working 
hours.279 In Greece, since 2011, a new unified pay grid has been implemented. On the other 
hand, Portugal has not yet implemented the plan for a new pay grid, which is still pending.280  
 
 
C. Policy outcomes  
 
i. Quality of Governance 
The scores of the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators concerning the quality 
of Greece’s and Portugal’s governance constitute a useful database for assessing the qualitative 
impact of the crisis.281 These scores present a notable deterioration in the Greek government’s 
effectiveness as well a relative improvement in the Portuguese government’s effectiveness.282 
Furthermore, there is an obvious decline in the Greek regulatory quality; thus, the regulatory 
quality in Portugal has experienced improvement. During the period of the crisis, not only the 
scores of the rule of law were negatively affected in Greece, but also the performance of the 
country recorded a sharp decline. Contrary, Portugal’s score has improved since 2010.283   
 
Moreover, according to Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators, both 
countries have recorded an average relative deterioration. 284  These indicators assess the 
executive capacity of national governments. Country performance on each indicator fluctuates 
from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Concentrating on the variables mostly related to the public 
administration, some improvement has been recorded concerning the application of the 
Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA).285 Therefore, in Greece, the respective scores indicate 
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that these instruments are not applied or do not exist. On the other hand, they are applicable in 
some cases in Portugal but lack a common methodology. Policy implementation largely 
depended on the administrative apparatus as being the executive branch of government, has 
presented both negative and positive shifts in Greece.286 In the Portuguese case, over the past 
years, the policy’s implementation effectiveness has tended to slightly deteriorate.  
 
Concerning the efficiency of public administration facilitating in the economic activity of 
private actors and businesses, since 2010, both countries have recorded some progress. 
However, the consideration of inefficient government as one of the most problematic factors for 
doing business does exist.287 
 
On the other hand, regarding a citizen’s perspective, a sharp decline in trust in national 
governments from the beginning of the crisis as well as in the course of the fiscal adjustments 
programs is recorded.288 Since 2010, compared to the EU average scores of trust in national 
governments, the Greek Government’s scores of trust have been extremely low and far 
below.289 With reference to Portuguese citizens’ satisfaction related to political institutions and 
public services in key policy areas, this as recorded a marked decrease throughout the crisis 
years;290 thus, recently, in 2016, the restoration of the citizens’ trust in the government seems to 
have been achieved, and simultaneously those trust reached a notable higher score (33%).291    
 
All the available data considered, Portugal performs better in most areas related to 
government and public administration compared to Greece’s performance. However, the last 
achieved a certain improvement, yet still lags behind. The impact of the crisis on the 
governance’s qualitative variables varies and positive as well as negative shifts occurred. In the 
Greek case, the deterioration of the critical indicators associating with the quality of the 
governance is much more noticeable. On the other hand, the negative effects of the crisis were 
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more limited in Portugal; yet in comparison with other western European countries, Greece and 
Portugal exhibit poor performance. Simultaneously, they are ranked low in most areas 
associated with the quality of governance and public administration.  
 
ii. Financial Performance 
The Economic Adjustment Programs implementation had a definitely decisive effect on 
the public sector’s financial indicator. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, there was an 
improvement in most indicators.292 The decrease of the government expenditure, the increase of 
the revenues, as well as the notable decline of the government borrowing (% GDP) were 
realized over the past years. In the Greek case, the cost-cutting measures had a greater effect 
considering that since 2009 there was a sharp contraction, and thus a decline of 25% of the 
country’s GDP. 293  Additionally, the cost of the public sector wage bill has experienced a 
significant reduction in both countries in the nominal prices and as a percentage of GDP, 
together with a notable reduction in the public sector’s employees’ number.294 
 
D. Assessment of policy outcomes 
According to previous research, the often-focused on short-term fiscal targets for 
generating direct saving policy responses were the national governments’ reaction to fiscal 
austerity and the Eurozone crisis. Thus, the systematic restructuring of the administrative 
apparatus was an area of a little attention.295 Greece's and Portugal's cases largely verify the 
alleged hypothesis. 296  In addition, the need for fiscal recovery drove mostly the reform 
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programs, and the cost-cutting and downsizing requirements set the tone.297 Consequently, the 
implementation of a deep horizontal budget and personnel cuts including a clear fiscal focus 
realized in the public administration area. Simultaneously, the restructure, merge as well as the 
abolishment of some entities were also realized. The public administration had to absorb the 
imposed adjustment shock and to respond effectively to its modernization structural 
requirements. 
 
Although notable changes occurred, for instance, the strengthening of the financial 
management, e-government tools as well as the human resources policies,298 it is debatable 
whether the question of the initiated programs were reforms of radical transformations. For 
certain, the public sectors of Greece and Portugal became apparently smaller and less costly; 
thus, this does not automatically mean that these public sectors are now functioning in a more 
efficient and effective way. 299 According to evaluation reports, initial goals were not fully 
achieved; 300  yet, a gap between programmatic statements as well actual results remains. 
Additionally, the compliance rate varies and the emphasized need for further structural 
measures is underlined in both cases.301 
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Only lately, a shift from fiscal targets to an improvement in the public administration’s 
quality seems to proceed.302 Nevertheless, despite certain financial criteria being met, in some 
cases, the implemented criteria had a reverse or, in other words, a negative effect on the public 
sector’s efficiency and service quality.303 As a case in point, the public sector layoffs caused 
plentiful consequences namely a substantial loss of experienced employees as well as problems 
in the effective delivery of public sectors.304  
 
E. Explanatory Factors 
One explanation of the outcomes of the reforms could be on the basis of inadequate 
planning to some degree. Some of the initial assumptions concerning the adjustment process, as 
well the fiscal targets were over-optimistic and practically unrealistic; additionally, the 
administrative system’s capacity to implement the reforms was weak. 305  Furthermore, it is 
doubtful whether the required adjustments are compatible with several country-specific 
features.306  Similarly to previous reform efforts pursuing the transferring of the governance and 
administrative models from the supranational institutions level to the domestic reality,307 the 
particularities of the southern bureaucracies as well as Greece’s and Portugal’s administrative 
culture have not been sufficiently taken into consideration, particularly concerning the 
involvement of the external actors. Other factors related to the poor results surpass public 
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administration and associate with the external macroeconomic environment as well as the 
domestic economic conditions.308   
 
Unpredicted factors and legal barriers also affected policy outcomes, while in many cases 
the initiated measures met strong resistance inhibiting the implementation. For example, the 
Constitutional Court of Portugal abolished some of the cutbacks targeting civil service, one of 
which was the wage cuts in the public sector.309 The measures, especially with a high political 
cost of compliance, such as public service layoffs, practically damaged the legitimization as 
well as the acceptance of the reform programs and no substantial gain was produced. 310 
Additionally, many measures, such as the increase in working hours, the requalification 
scheme, the freeze of the wage bill in Portugal, were reversed or canceled.311   
  
Comparatively speaking, additional factors estimate the varying effect as well as the 
outcomes of the adjustment programs. The characterization of a ‘failure’ or a ‘success’ story 
often illustrates Greece and Portugal respectively; additionally, Greece’s adjustment program is 
characterized as the least successful among the peripheral countries.312 Nevertheless, no full 
confirmation of this hypothesis has been carried out, either regarding the adjustment programs 
in general or the administrative reforms in particular. 313  According to the findings of the 
analysis, a range of variables affecting the final results should be considered for the assessment 
of the outcomes of the adjustment programs.  
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Analytically, although the policy mix resembles similar, thus the conditions under which 
it was implemented are almost different. The ‘financial vulnerability’ , 314  the depth of the 
recession, as well as, the deterioration of the economic situation of each country affected their  
policy outcomes. As far as the deterioration of the economic situation is concerned, in the 
Greek case, it has been undoubtedly more severe. 315   Another essential difference is the 
situation of the two countries before the crisis erupted. During the preceding decade, regarding 
the public sector, Portugal had implemented several cost-cutting measures leading to some 
savings, such as the measurement of the reduction in the number of as well compensation to 
public sector employees. 316  Contrary, in Greece of the pre-crisis condition, there was no 
concrete effort to confront the poor financial performance of the public sector despite the 
warning signs.317  
 
Additionally, certain country particularities influenced the process of the administrative 
reform. The domestic politics, as well as the dynamics of political representation, were among 
the critical variables.318 Although, these governments faced hard resistance against the austerity 
packages, compared to Greece’s political conditions during the implementation phase, those in 
Portugal were more favorable. Furthermore, the ownership of the reform programs, as well as 
the involvement of the supra-national actors,319 were some of the additional factors strongly 
delegitimized the initiated reforms. The government of Portugal cooperated well with the 
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Troika;320 thus, a constant tension between the policy-makers and external actors characterized 
the Greek case.321 In the latter case, the initiated policies were lacking public support as the 
reforms were seen as an externally imposed obligation. 
 
The varying ‘reform ability’ and the institutional capacity of each country also affect the 
outcomes of the adjustment programs.322 The empirical data previously presented indicates that 
governance, and also administrative capacity indicators have been higher in Portugal than in 
Greece, meaning that the administrative apparatus was more capable of implementing the 
required reforms.323 On the other hand, Greece records relatively lower performance, and its 
distance to cover is longer, also considering the combined effect of the mounting fiscal stress. 324 
The particular south European administrative tradition, as well as, the country-specific cultural 
patterns are also responsible for the observed variations. 325  In this respect, the prevailing 
political and also administrative culture,326 which also explains the long-standing low capacity 
of the Greek state apparatus, 327  may provide an additional explanation of the observed 
variations.  
 
F. Conclusion 
This part explored and assessed the impact of the Eurozone crisis on both, the Greek and 
Portuguese public administration. Greece and Portugal provided a good basis for comparative 
                                                          
320 Sapir, A., Wolff, G., De Sousa, C., and Terzi, A. (2014), “The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and 
failures”, Study on the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), Brussels, p. 44. 
321 Featherstone, K. (2015), “External conditionality and the debt crisis: the ‘Troika’ and public administration reform in 
Greece”, Journal of European Public Policy, 22(3), 295-314. 
322 Heinemann, F., and Grigoriadis, Th. (2016), “Origins of reform resistance and the Southern European regime”, Empirica, 
Austrian Institute for Economic Research, Austrian Economic Association, 43(4), 661-691. 
323 Lampropoulou, M. (2017), “Administrative Reforms and the Eurozone Crisis: A comparative study of Greece and Portugal”, 
PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, p. 351. 
324 Op. cit. 
325 Rocha, O., and Zavale B. (2015), “Financial crisis adjustment and state reform: The case of Portugal”, Global Journal of 
Political Science and Administration, 3(1), 10-20. ISSN 2054-6343. 
326 Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2014), “Response to session 1 ‘International experiences of administrative reform”, Administrative 
reform in Greece – A Report on a keynote policy symposium of the Hellenic Observatory. LSE (April 11), 20-22, available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Va rious/Administrative-Reform-in-Greece-
%E2%80%93-A-Report-on-a-Keynote- Policy-Symposium-of-the-Hellenic-Observatory,-LSE.pdf. , access on 1/7/2018. 
Featherstone, K. (2015). External conditionality and the debt crisis: the ‘Troika’ and public administration reform in Greece . 
Journal of European Public Policy, 22(3), 295-314. 
327 Spanou, C., Sotiropoulos, D. (2011), “The odyssey of administrative reforms in Greece, 1981–2009: a tale of two reform 
paths”, Public Administration, 89(3), 723–737. 
 
 72 
study given the common roots of their administrative tradition, on the grounds that they share 
certain similar historical, political, economical as well as social characteristics, and also the 
case that the peripheral countries were hard-hit by the crisis.   
 
The Greek and Portuguese adjustment programs content and design present several 
similarities. In both cases, the strong influence of external actors shaped the domestic political 
agendas, and additionally, the austerity and contractionary fiscal policies set the tone. The 
Memoranda directly included the agreed upon strict conditionality administrative reforms. The 
policy mix was a combination of structural as well as fiscal measures. The primary aim of the 
programs was the reduction of the cost and the enhancement of the efficiency of the public 
sector.  Great emphasis was placed on downsizing and cost-cutting measures having an impact 
on the formal structures of public administration, the administrative procedures, as well as the 
civil service. The areas that were the most affected were those that could have a fiscal effect, 
such as wage cuts, personnel reductions, and budget monitoring.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative indicators assess the impact of the adjustment programs on 
public administration. Although some targets were met, thus, certain implementation gaps were 
observed. Additionally, the actual results often diverged considerably from the expected ones. 
Moreover, the crisis directly affected positively the public sector financial performance and 
most indicators recorded improvement. The horizontal cuts were largely responsible for the 
abovementioned. Contrary, the adjustment programs qualitative effect is not as clear as its fiscal 
effect. Evidence gave mix results. Regarding the quality of governance, there is a clear 
deterioration of Greece’s scores, while Portugal has exhibited relative improvement. Indicators 
recording the executive capacity in both countries showed a downward inclination in most 
areas. In the crisis years, citizens’ trust has declined and, especially in Greece, has remained at a 
very low level.  
 
Compared to other previous reform efforts, the aim of the administrative reform programs 
of the crisis period was the downsizing and cost reducing measures. These measures had 
priority on the basis of the implementation towards the structural adjustments and quality 
improvements.  Although initiated policies partly reflected a neoliberal agenda, there was no 
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clear reform pattern.328 In this point of view, there can be an argumentation that those reforms 
were primarily technical driven by fiscal urgency. Thus, it is partly explained that, while 
financial performance has improved, the public administration’s quality was often negatively  
affected. This negative correlation was especially intense in the Greek case that achieved the 
largest fiscal adjustment, and simultaneously, experienced a sharp deterioration in the quality of 
governance as well as administration.   
 
Various social, political, as well as economic factors that affected policy outcomes, 
explained the divergences observed between Greece and Portugal. Along with the different 
starting points and including the scale of required adjustments, implementation conditions 
deviated considerably between these two countries. Reform prospects also vary. Portugal exited 
the financial program in May 2014, under present circumstances. Contrary, Greece was till 
recently under a bailout program having uncertain prospects. Nevertheless, in both cases, no 
evidence proves the shift from the fiscal adjustment phase to one of the structural reforms. 
 
This part investigated the process of administrative reform during the bailout programs in 
Greece and Portugal. Though, there is a difficulty in estimating the long-term consequences of 
the described adjustments on the public administration yet. Further research remains to be done 
concerning the sustainability of the implemented reforms in the post-adjustment period. 
Additionally, a more detailed from a theoretical point of view way could address the 
implications of the Eurozone crisis for public administration. For case in point, an intriguing 
issue would be the degree of convergence or even divergence to a reform pattern, pressuring by 
external fiscal constraints. Similarly, the linearity of the pre-crisis, and also, the post-crisis 
reform paths could be assessed, as well. This study focused on two cases studies; yet, further 
work should include broader clusters of countries affected by the crisis. Finally, a valuable 
direction for future research would be the crisis’s effect comparative assessment of different 
administrative systems and especially between the EU core and periphery countries.  
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Conclusion 
Whether, in a developed country like Greece, the administrative crisis is a persistent 
phenomenon remains a basic question. The reason is that although the implied various reforms 
that have taken place over more than the last 40 years, as well as, the widespread consensus for 
the need of modernizing the political system as a whole, however, the state bureaucracy along 
with the administration have failed to improve in a substantial way. Additionally, the worst 
symptoms of maladministration and bureaupathology have not been overcome.329 The crisis 
features and characteristics seem to persist, if not intensify; additionally, they manifest 
themselves not only in the public’s finance widening gap or deficit but also in the public’s 
sector nearly negative efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative behavior. Related 
aspects of the administrative crisis include the following: 
 
1. The excessive, especially in the past, size of personnel. 
2.  The uneven allocation of duties and responsibilities, as well as the limited 
professional expertise of public employment. 
3. The outmoded and ill-shaped organizational structures. 
4. The virtual absence of modern management principles, methods, and techniques.  
5. The prevailing legalism, formalism, and underdevelopment of professional ethos 
as well as disrespect for morality in modern Greece’s administrative culture.  
 
The administrative crisis does also seem to reflect, and thus, perpetuate the whole wider 
inertia and weakness of the public sector. However, the causes of this inertia ought to be sought 
both at the structure as well as foundations of the political behavior over the years rather than a 
particular coincidence.  
 
The current economic crisis, that Greece is facing from 2008 and onwards, has 
dramatically proven the weakness of the Greek economy along with plenty of state 
inefficiencies. There is an important implementation gap as far as certain reforms related to 
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managerialism and de-politicization of personnel recruitment and career development are 
concerned. Other reforms, such as decentralization, regulatory agencies, inspection and control 
bodies, have promising results but uneven in the medium term. In the Greek context, a short-
term horizon limits every new reform in which each reform either has to produce its results or 
die. Changes of policy priorities, even within the same government, are led by ministerial 
turnover and are widespread given the absence of long-term policy goals, as well the lack of 
serious preparation of reforms. Furthermore, changes in government structure indicate changes 
of personnel in top administrative positions, and thus institutional memory and experience are 
lost. This constitutes a phenomenon that underlines the way the political system traditionally 
operates, and at the same time, a source of fragmentation of efforts along with lack of 
continuity and political commitment. Additionally, this phenomenon is also linked to the lack 
of sustainability, and thus even to the cessation of reform efforts. Greece is a sum of semi-
closed markets, concerning the political one, where corruption and nepotism prevail. Its 
political system has been characterized as an environment of weak institutions and of strong 
special interest groups that privileges the lack of transparency and accountability. In that weak 
institutionalized system, complex interactions between the various government branches, 
voters, interest groups etc. do dominate and exist, making reforms difficult to implement. Each 
of the aforementioned groups plays an important and a given role in this power game and seeks 
to defend the status quo against any reforms. In such a context, clientelistic or corporatist 
pressures, which prepare the ground for resistance to change, enter with great ease in decision-
making centers, distort official policy objectives, as well allow the implementation to drift. 
Hence informally operating procedures and domestic political dynamics are at the center of this 
type of resistance to change or in other words, are an obstacle to reform. In another vein, budget 
constraints often impede reform efforts.  Typically, an incoming government firstly introduces a 
policy initiative, then allocates limited funds to its implementation, and finally starts reducing 
government spending until the whole thing expires. Although, parties of the whole political 
spectrum widely accept the importance of administrative reform, in practice, reform initiatives 
lack persistence and continuity. 
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National Strategy for Administrative Reform 2017-2019 
 
The National Strategy for Administrative Reform 2016-2018 noted the number of 
weaknesses to be addressed in the context of a medium to a long-term action plan:  
 
i. Inability to design and implement public policies:  
The design and implementation of integrated public policies is a major weakness as it 
leads to fragmented interventions, overlaps, and mutually exclusive actions, maintaining an 
environment characterized by intense fragmentation and dispersion across all parameters 
(responsibilities, structures, infrastructure, human resources, etc.). etc.) that define the policy 
field.  
 
ii. Lack of coordination: 
 The main obstacles are the lack of a coordinating mechanism for the implementation of 
reforms, the absence of co-operation networks in the public administration, the existence of 
administrative constraints and the fragmented and disrupted operational model of the Greek 
public administration. 
 
iii. Insufficient utilization and irrational distribution of human 
potential: 
Human resources management has also been problematic. It is characterized by its narrow 
perspective, lack of design and strategic perception. The reduction in staff, coupled with 
political choices that alienated staff from the objectives of reform policy, are factors that have 
destabilized the system and reduced its coherence. At the same time, the irrational distributions 
that still exist, both in terms of the number of employees and their skills, lead to the 
phenomenon of uneven staffing and the inappropriate use of valuable human resources. 
According to the "Analysis of Regular Staff of the Year 2016" (Ministry of Administrative 
Reconstruction, 24.4.2017), the total change in the regular staff of the public administration for 
the years 2009-2016 is -18.4% and corresponds to 127.236 employees. Moreover, according to 
OECD data, public sector employment as a percentage of total employment in Greece is lower 
than the average of OECD countries. 
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Setting a strict quota as a measure to reduce the public sector's human resources (retirement 
recruitment ratio), without prior consideration of the demographic characteristics of the already 
"aging" Greek public administration, resulted in: 
 
 The deterioration of the average age of human resources 
 The subsistence of a significant number of services. 
 
iv.  Problematic regulatory framework: 
 The plurality, the malignity and the complexity of regulatory texts and regulations create 
problems of understanding, compliance and legal certainty for both citizens and businesses, and 
for the public administration itself. 
 
v. Lack of eGovernment issues: 
 E-government and e-services for citizens remain at an early stage, and there are vital 
deficiencies in data collection, processing, and management. 
 
vi. The absence of modern methods, techniques and management tools: 
In Greece, public policy-making has not yet been developed on the basis of documentation, 
reflecting both the poverty of data held by the administration and the culture of legalism. The 
procedures for collecting, compiling and analyzing data are inadequate. Incomplete and 
inappropriate data collection and classification makes it more difficult to develop policies based 
on empirical data and limits the ability to identify early and effectively resolve problems. 
 
Action Program 2017-2019 aimed at: 
 
1. New partnerships and the exploitation of international know-how 
2. New institutional interventions in the direction of meritocracy, transparency, and 
impartiality 
3. A new framework for addressing corruption and maladministration 
4. Addressing the lack of implementation of public policies 
5. Improving the horizontal and vertical coordination of public administration bodies 
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6. Addressing overlays and lack of competence 
7. Upgrading the quality of services 
8. Abbreviation of the quality of administrative services 
9. Functional separation of executive and executive responsibilities 
10. Improving assessment methods 
 
According to the national plan, by the end of 2019 the following reforms should be 
completed: 
1. The completion of the Development of a Register of Procedures in the Public 
Administration Bodies 
2. The implementation of a plan and standardization of services under the new 
Quality Assurance Framework 
3. A complete transition to the digital Citizens Service Centers (KEP), 
4. The completion of the Digital Action Plans with all Ministries and Regions,  
5. The implementation of its structural elements eGovernment and Digital Economy 
and horizontal actions 
6. The implementation of projects and ICT actions in the public sector 
 
 
The Optimal Strategy 
 
In any case, the Greek setting represented a ‘least likely case’ regarding external 
conditionality to stimulate domestic reform. 330  There has been a long notice of the 
dysfunctionalities of the Greek public administration. 331  The party-state relationship has 
involved clientelistic appointments across the public sector, constraining the political will to 
reform. Thus, the Greek case indicates the conceptual relevance of differences of administrative 
                                                          
330 Flyvbjerg, B. (2006), ‘Five misunderstandings about case-study research’, Qualitative Inquiry 12(2): 219–45. 
331 Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2001), ‘Learning and steering: changing implementation patterns and the Greek central government’, 
Journal of European Public Policy 8(4): 604–22. 
Flogaitis, S. (1987), Το Ελληνικό Διοικητικό Σύστημα’ (The Greek Administrative System), Athens: Ant. Sakkoulas. 
Makrydemetres, A. and Michalopoulos, N. (2000),  ‘Εκθέσεις εμπειρογνωμόνων για τη δημόσια διοίκηση 1950–1998’ 
[Experts’ Reports on Public Administration, 1950–1998], Athens: Papazisis. 
Spanou, C. and Sotiropoulos, D. (2011), ‘The odyssey of administrative reforms in Greece, 1981–2009: a tale of two reform 
paths’, Public Administration 89(3): 723 – 37. 
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tradition as well cultural norms, but also the dysfunctional application of the strategy with 
impacts on actor interests and ownership. Consequently, it raises important strategic issues for 
the EU, namely the question of its effectiveness in reaching into robust domestic settings to 
lever institutional reform, the question of ability or appropriateness of imposing the EU a 
preferred policy model. The extent to which the crisis has incited a paradigmatic shift in 
administrative reform remained ambiguous. This appeared more in the realm of the middle-
level policy change; it was not a crucial break with the established, Napoleonic state tradition. 
 
 Regarding the prospects of reform, the optimal strategy would rather tend to focus on 
both increasing and improving the capacity and also the quality of state machinery. Thus, that 
would entail to a certain extent taking measures for reducing the overall size and scope of state 
involvement as well as intervention in the economy and society. It seems that a necessary 
reversal of the overstretched and oversized state involvement of the overregulated economy and 
society is likely required for rolling back to more manageable proportions.332 Simultaneously, a 
relevant precondition, a conditio sine qua non, for the further development in the economy’s 
productive sectors would relate to the substantial amelioration of the quality, and furthermore, 
professionalism of public services. Namely, the capacity of the state to act effectively and 
efficiently, in a manner that is responsible and accountable to the people as well civil society at 
large is urgently needed. The raising of the capacity level of the Greek administrative system 
does unquestionably involve the reshaping of the structure of central service units, and 
particularly, the reduction of the number of the related to the central policy determination units.  
 
All-inclusive, a kind of a pragmatic shift is underlying the whole effort for reinventing 
public governance and administration in contemporary Greece. Therefore, a new emphasis is 
more than visible on the vital need to circumscribe the institutional monopoly of the centralized 
state administration through attempting to reduce as well optimize its regulatory intervention in 
the economy and society.  
    
 
                                                          
332  Makrydemetres Anth (2013), Weaving Penelope’s Web. Administration and Democracy in Contemporary Greece, 
Administration and Society – No 9, Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications, pp. 133-135. 
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Appendix 
FIGURE 1: Greek ministry data – the total number of administrative reform actions in Greece, 
2007–13 
 
 
 
Source: Data from the website of the Ministry of Administrative Reform and e-Governance, Greece, collated by 
LSE Hellenic Observatory 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Greek ministry data – administrative reforms pre-MoU by subject category 
 
Source: Data from the website of the Ministry of Administrative Reform and e-Governance, Greece, collated by 
LSE Hellenic Observatory 
 
FIGURE 3: Troika reports – administrative reforms in Greece post-MoU (2010–13) by subject 
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category 
 
 
Source: The data here is taken from the reports of the ‘Troika’, differentiated according to the typology of 
Ongaro333. 
 
FIGURE 4: Greek ministry data on administrative reforms of Greek government by type, 2010 
– 12 
 
Source: Data from website of Ministry for Administrative Reform, Greece, and differentiated according to the 
typology of Ongaro334. 
 
 
                                                          
333 Ongaro, E. (2009) Public Management Reform and Modernization: Trajectories of Administrative Change in Italy, France, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
334 Ongaro, E. (2009) Public Management Reform and Modernization: Trajectories of Administrative Change in Italy, France, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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TABLE 1: State organization & Administrative Divisions 
 
TABLE 2: Public Employment (2009-2015) 
 
TABLE 3: Governance Scores* (2010-2015) 
 2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 2013 2014 
 
2015 
 
Government Effectiveness 
Greece 0.55 0.50 0.32 0.46 0.40 0.25 
Portugal 1.02 0.96 1.05 1.24 1.01 1.23 
Regulatory Quality 
Greece 0.63 0.49 0.51 0.62 0.34 0.40 
Portugal 0.73 0.63 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.94 
Rule of Law 
Greece 0.61 0.55 0.40 0.45 0.34 0.24 
Portugal 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.13 1.14 
* -2.5 to +2.5 
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
LEVELS & STRUCTURE OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS 
Greece 
Central 
Administration Decentralised 
Administrative Units Local 
Government (Municipalities 
/Region 
Decentralized Administrative 
Units (7) 
Regions (13) ) Municipalities 
(325) 
Portuga
l 
Direct State Administration 
Indirect State Administration 
Autonomous Administration 
(Regional/Local/Associations) 
Administrative Regions (18) 
Intermunicipal Communities 
(21) Municipalities 
(308) Parishes (3.091) 
Metropolitan Areas (2) 
Autonomous Regions (2) 
 2009 2010 2011 
 
2012 2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
Greece 865.153 796.947 715.686 629.114 599.207 576.856 566.913 
 
Portugal - - 727.642 
 
699.829 674.660 
 
656.056 
 
658.459 
 
Source: Hellenic Ministry of Administrative Reform; Boletim Estatistico do Emprego Publico 
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TABLE 4: Governance: Executive Capacity: 2009-2016* 
 
Greece  
 Portugal  
 
2009 2011 2014 2015 2016  2009 2011 2014 2015 2016 
Strategic Capacity 
3,0 4,0 5,5 5,0 
 
4,5  6,5    6,0 5,0  5,0 5,0 
Interministerial 
Coordination 
5,2 4,7 6,0 5,7 5,0  6,5 6,7 6,8  6,8 7,0 
Evidence-based 
Instruments (RIA) 
1,0 2,0 1,3 1,3 
 
1,3  2,3 5,0 1,6  2,7 3,0 
Societal Consultation 5,0 5,0 2,0 2,0 3,0  5,0 5,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 
Policy Communication 
4,0 6,0 2,0 3,0 
 
3,0  9,0 8,0 7,0 5,0 6,0 
 Implementation 4,0 
 
3,4 4,5 4,6 4,0  6,8 6,5 6,8 6,6 6,4 
Adaptability 
 
3,7 
 
4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5  8,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 
  AVG 
 
3,70 
 
4,23 3,69 3,73 3,61  6,30 6,31 5,46 5,30 5,49 
* 1 tο 10 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators 
 
TABLE 5: Inefficient Government Bureaucracy* (2010-2016) 
 2010-2011                  2012-2013                2014-2015            2016-2017 
Greece                         27.2               21.0               19.8             15.6 
Portugal                      20.6              15.2               19.2               15.3 
Responses weighted according to a 1-5 ranking of the five most problematic factors for doing business  
Source: World Economic Forum - Global Competitiveness Index 
 
TABLE 6: Trust in Government (2009-2016) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
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GREECE 44% 21% 8% 7% 10% 11% 16% 11% 
PORTUGAL 32% 
 
19% 24% 
 
22% 15% 
 
17% 15% 
 
33% 
EU27/28 29% 28% 24% 
 
27% 23%  29% 27% 
 
27% 
Source: EC Eurobarometers 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84 
 
Index I 
Public Sector Indicators (2009-2015) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 % Change 
        2009/2014 2009/2015 
TOTAL GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (% GDP) 
Greece 54.1 52.5 54.2 55.3 62.1 50.7 55.3 -6.28% 2.22% 
Portugal 50.2 51.8 50.0 48.5 49.9 51.7 48.3 2.99% -3.78% 
TOTAL GENERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE (% GDP) 
Greece 38.9 41.3 44.0 46.4 49.1 47.0 48.1 20.82% 23.65% 
Portugal 40.4 40.6 42.6 42.9 45.1 44.5 43.9 10.15% 8.66% 
COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES (Q4) 
Greece 
% 
GDP 
13.9 12.6 13.2 13.5 12.6 13.1 12.7 -5.7% -8.6% 
Cur. 
Price
s 
(mill. 
€) 
8,697.
7 
7,155.
3 
6,798.
7 
6,479.
0 
5,649.
4 
5,878.
2 
5,674.
7 
-32.41% -34.75% 
Portugal 
% 
GDP 
17.5 16.7 16.1 14.4 15.2 13.5 13.2 -22.8% -24.5% 
Cur. 
Price
s 
(mill. 
€) 
8,032.
4 
7,770.
6 
7,168.
0 
6,120.
7 
6,703.
0 
5,881.
7 
5,971.
8 
-26.78% -25.66% 
NET LENDING/BORROWING (% GDP) 
Greece -15.2 -11.2 -10.2 -8.8 -13.0 -3.6 -7.2 -76.32% -52.63% 
Portugal -9.8 -11.2 -7.4 -5.7 -4.8 -7.2 -4.4 -26.53% -55.10% 
GDP (market prices) 
Greece 
237,53
4.2 
226,03
1.4 
207,02
8.9 
191,20
3.9 
180,38
9.0 
177,55
9.4 
176,02
2.7 
-25.25% -25.89% 
Portugal 
175,44
8.2 
179,92
9.8 
176,16
6.6 
168,39
8.0 
170,26
9.3 
173,44
6.2 
179,37
6.4 
1.14% 2.24% 
Source: Eurostat 
 
